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	<title>건강과 대안 &#187; protective vaccination</title>
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		<title>[구제역] FAO 자료, 돼지 구제역 백신 방어율 10일째 19%, 29일째 75% 불과</title>
		<link>http://www.chsc.or.kr/?post_type=reference&#038;p=2655</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Jan 2011 17:34:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>건강과대안</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[식품 · 의약품]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FMD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[protective vaccination]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vaccinate to live]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[구제역]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[돼지]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[매몰작업]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[백신]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[백신 방어율]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[살처분]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[항체형성]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[과학적으로 접근했을 때, 백신만 접종하면 안심이라고 생각하거나, 백신만이 유일한 대안이라고 주장하는 것은 근거가 아주 빈약합니다.백신정책과 살처분 정책을 동시에 실시해야 구제역을 근절시킬 수 있습니다.2001년 우루과이를 백신정책이 성공한 대료적인 사례로 [...]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>과학적으로 접근했을 때, 백신만 접종하면 안심이라고 생각하거나, 백신만이 유일한 대안이라고 주장하는 것은 근거가 아주 빈약합니다.<BR><BR>백신정책과 살처분 정책을 동시에 실시해야 구제역을 근절시킬 수 있습니다.<BR><BR>2001년 우루과이를 백신정책이 성공한 대료적인 사례로 꼽지만&#8230; 그 외의 국가에서<BR>백신정책이 성공한 사례가 그리 많지 않습니다. 잘못하면 한국의 현상황은 1997년 대만 사례의 되풀이가 될 우려도 있습니다.<BR><BR>우루과이가 백신정책에 성공할 수 있었던 가장 큰 요인은 돼지의 사육이 많지 않았기<BR>때문으로 추정됩니다.<BR><BR>[우루과이 축산현황(2010)]<BR><BR>* 소 1180만두 사육, 240만두 도축, 10억불 수출<BR>* 돼지 20만두 사육, 2009년 수입 1만 5천 톤, 수출 27톤<BR><BR>(더 자세한 현황은 건강과 대안 자료실 참고<BR><A href="http://www.chsc.or.kr/xe/?mid=reference&#038;module_srl=206&#038;category=269&#038;document_srl=49676&#038;listStyle=&#038;cpage=" target=_blank>http://www.chsc.or.kr/xe/?mid=<WBR>reference&#038;module_srl=206&#038;<WBR>category=269&#038;document_srl=<WBR>49676&#038;listStyle=&#038;cpage=</A>)<BR><BR>일반적으로 소에서는 백신에 의한 방어율이 높게 나오거든요. 1차 백신 후 2주 후에 85% 이상, 4주~6주 후 2차 백신 후 97.5% 이상됩니다.<BR><BR>돼지 구제역 백신에 대한 신뢰할만한 평가자료는 많지 않습니다. 영국 퍼브라이트 연구소 (Pirbright Laboratory) 소속 과학자들이 2007년 [Vaccine]지(2007 Nov 7;25(45):7806-17)에 발표한 논문을 보면&#8230;<BR><BR>이번 한국에서 접종한 백신균주와 똑같은 O1 Manisa 백신을 맞은 2그룹의 돼지(1그룹 16마리, 2그룹 8마리)에게 백신접종을 한 다음에 각각 10일째, 29일째 후에 9시간 동안 바이러스를 직접 접촉시키고 이후 30일 동안 돼지들을 모니터했습니다.<BR><BR>그리고 돼지의 코와 구강인두부에서 바이러스가 얼마나 배출되는지, 바이러스 감염과 보호를 연구하기 위해 세포 매개성 면역반응을 측정하였습니다.<BR><BR>돼지의 백신 방어율 수치가 생각보다 &nbsp;많이 낮은 것을 확인할 수 있는데요&#8230;<BR>접종 후 10일째 방어율은 19%에 불과했고, 29일째 방어율은 75%에 이르렀습니다.<BR>따라서 돼지의 경우 백신접종 후 최소한 1개월은 지나야 75% 정도의 방어율이<BR>생긴다는 얘기이고&#8230; 백신의 질병 예방 효과는 충분하지 않은 문제점이 있습니다.<BR><BR>또한 백신접종을 실시한 돼지가 예방주사를 맞지 않은 돼지보다 바이러스 배출량이 훨씬 더 적었습니다. 다시말해 백신은 바이러스 배출억제 효과가 있기 때문에 전파 속도를 줄일 수 있다고 해석할 수 있습니다.<BR><BR>임상증상이 나타나지 않은 9마리의 돼지 중에서 7마리(1그룹 3두 중 3두, 2그룹 6두 중 4두)가 무증상(無症狀) 감염을 보였으며, NSP 검사를 통하여 모두 항체가 형성되었음이 확인되었습니다.<BR><BR>연구자들은 비록 백신접종이 임상적 및 바이러스학적으로 완벽한 방어를 나타내지 못했으나, 질병의 중증도를 감소시키고, 바이러스의 분비를 줄였으며, 비구조적 구제역 바이러스 항체를 생산하였고, 그 이후에 돼지를 감염시켰습니다고 밝히고 있습니다.<BR><BR>호주정부나 일본정부처럼 구제역 백신접종을 한 동물들을 모두 살처분하는 정책을 실시하지 않을 경우, 중국이나 베트남처럼 구제역 상재국이 되어 연중 수시로 구제역이 재발할 우려가 높습니다.<BR><BR>그래서 호주에서는 구제역 백신 접종 후 그 동물들을 살리기 위한 보호적 백신(protective vaccination =vaccinate to live) 정책을 금지하고 있습니다.<BR>(호주정부 관련 내용은 건강과 대안 자료실 내용 참고 <A href="http://www.chsc.or.kr/xe/?mid=reference&#038;module_srl=206&#038;category=269&#038;document_srl=49704&#038;listStyle=&#038;cpage=" target=_blank>http://www.chsc.or.kr/xe/?mid=<WBR>reference&#038;module_srl=206&#038;<WBR>category=269&#038;document_srl=<WBR>49704&#038;listStyle=&#038;cpage=</A>)<BR><BR>백신접종으로 구제역의 확산을 막은 후 백신접종한 가축을 모두 살처분하는 억제적 백신(suppressive vaccination=vaccinate to die) 정책을 도입하는 것이 구제역을 근절시키고 청정국 지위를 회복할 수 있는 방안이 아닐까 생각합니다.<BR><BR>그러나 현재 국내는 전국백신을 시행한 상황이라 어쩔 수 없이 보호적 백신(protective vaccination =vaccinateto live) 정책을 시행할 수 밖에 없는데요&#8230; 구제역을 근절시키고<BR>청정국 지위를 회복하기 위해서는 최소한 백신접종 정책과 살처분 정책을 병행해야<BR>할 것 같습니다. 다시 말해 백신접종 후 14일이 지났다고 하더라도 구제역 양성이<BR>확인되면 그 농장의 돼지를 전두수 살처분해야 구제역을 근절시킬 수 있을 것입니다.<BR><BR>&nbsp;<BR>================================&nbsp; <BR><BR>Evaluation of Emergency FMD vaccine in pigs following direct contact challenge<BR><BR>S Parida*, L Fleming, Y Oh, P A Hamblin, M Mahapatra, J Gloster, C Doel, H-H Takamatsu<BR>and D J Paton<BR>Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright Laboratory, Ash Road, Woking, Surrey GU24 0NF, UK<BR><BR>출처 : <A href="http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/commissions/docs/research_group/.../App52.pdf" target=_blank><FONT color=#0000cc>www.fao.org/ag/againfo/<WBR>commissions/docs/research_<WBR>group/&#8230;/App52.pdf</FONT></A><BR><BR>Introduction: The 2001 outbreak in the UK showed that strict movement controls<BR>combined with the stamping out of infected and contact animals are not always sufficient<BR>to eradicate FMD quickly, have high economic costs and cause great public alarm. In<BR>future, a policy of vaccinate-to-live may be included in the repertoire of control measures<BR>and in support of this approach, we have investigated: a) The efficacy of emergency FMD<BR>vaccine in pigs, b) The reduction in virus excretion from vaccinated and then infected pigs,<BR>c) The ability to detect infection in vaccinated pigs and d) The persistence of FMDV in the<BR>oropharynx of pigs.<BR><BR>Materials and Methods: Two groups (n=16 and n=8) of O1 Manisa vaccinated pigs were<BR>exposed to direct contact challenge with O1 UKG FMDV infected pigs for 9 hours at 10 and<BR>29 days after vaccination respectively. Thereafter, the pigs were monitored for another<BR>30days. Excretion of virus in nasal and oro-pharyngeal secretions and in exhaled air was<BR>measured by virus isolation and real time RT-PCR. Three different commercial serology<BR>ELISAs that detect antibodies to FMDV non-structural proteins (NSP) were evaluated for<BR>detection of infection in vaccinated animals. Cell mediated immune responses were also<BR>measured to study their relationship to protection and infection.<BR><BR>Results: Three out of sixteen and six out of eight pigs were clinically protected. Vaccinated<BR>pigs excreted less number of viruses than the unvaccinated controls. Seven of nine<BR>protected animals (3 from first and 4 from second experiment) were subclinically infected<BR>and all seroconverted in NSP tests. Bulk sera have been collected for use as NSP reference<BR>standards.<BR><BR>Conclusion: Although vaccination could not provide complete clinical or virological<BR>protection, it reduced virus excretion in infected pigs. Infection in vaccinated pigs was<BR>detected by NSP tests, even where infection was subclinical. Further details of virus<BR>excretion and persistence will be available shortly and will be presented in full.<BR><BR>========================================<BR><BR><br />
<P class=citation>2007년 영국 퍼브라이트 연구소(Pirbright Laboratory) 소속 연구자들은 O1 Manisa주 백신접종을 한 후 O1 UKG을 투여하여&nbsp;면역성을 실험했습니다.<BR><BR>백신 접종 후 10일째&nbsp; O1 UKG주를 투여한 돼지 중에서 81%가 구제역 임상증상을 나타냈으며, 백신 접종 후 29일째 O1 UKG주를 투여한 돼지 중에서 25%가 구제역 임상증상을 나타냈습니다.&nbsp;<BR><BR>비록 백신접종이 임상적 및 바이러스학적으로 완벽한&nbsp;방어를 나타내지 못했으나, 질병의 중증도를 감소시키고, 바이러스의 분비를 줄였으며, 비구조적 구제역 바이러스 항체를 생산하였고,&nbsp;그 이후에 돼지를 감염시켰습니다고 합니다.<BR>&nbsp;</P><br />
<H1 class=title>Reduction of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus load in nasal excretions, saliva and exhaled air of vaccinated pigs following direct contact challenge.</H1><br />
<P class=auth_list><A href="http://www.chsc.or.kr/pubmed?term=%22Parida%20S%22%5BAuthor%5D" _sg="true">Parida S</A>, <A href="http://www.chsc.or.kr/pubmed?term=%22Fleming%20L%22%5BAuthor%5D" _sg="true">Fleming L</A>, <A href="http://www.chsc.or.kr/pubmed?term=%22Oh%20Y%22%5BAuthor%5D" _sg="true">Oh Y</A>, <A href="http://www.chsc.or.kr/pubmed?term=%22Mahapatra%20M%22%5BAuthor%5D" _sg="true">Mahapatra M</A>, <A href="http://www.chsc.or.kr/pubmed?term=%22Hamblin%20P%22%5BAuthor%5D" _sg="true">Hamblin P</A>, <A href="http://www.chsc.or.kr/pubmed?term=%22Gloster%20J%22%5BAuthor%5D" _sg="true">Gloster J</A>, <A href="http://www.chsc.or.kr/pubmed?term=%22Doel%20C%22%5BAuthor%5D" _sg="true">Doel C</A>, <A href="http://www.chsc.or.kr/pubmed?term=%22Gubbins%20S%22%5BAuthor%5D" _sg="true">Gubbins S</A>, <A href="http://www.chsc.or.kr/pubmed?term=%22Paton%20DJ%22%5BAuthor%5D" _sg="true">Paton DJ</A>.</P><br />
<P class=aff>Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright Laboratory, Ash Road, Pirbright, Surrey GU24 0NF, United Kingdom. satya.parida@bbsrc.ac.uk<BR><BR><A title=Vaccine. href="http://www.chsc.or.kr/xe/_javascript:AL_get(this,%20'jour',%20'Vaccine.');" _sg="true">Vaccine.</A> 2007 Nov 7;25(45):7806-17. Epub 2007 Sep 17.</P><br />
<DIV class=abstract_text><br />
<H3 class=abstract_label>Abstract</H3><br />
<P>In future, a policy of &#8220;vaccinate-to-live&#8221; may be included in the repertoire of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) control measures and in support of this approach, we have investigated the hypothesis that vaccine-induced reduction in virus replication and excretion from pigs can be correlated to the severity of clinical signs of FMD by measuring excretion of virus in natural secretions and aerosols. The other aims of this study were to verify the existence of sub-clinical infection in vaccinated pigs, to evaluate the correlation between this and seroconversion to foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) non-structural protein antibodies and to re-examine the occurrence of FMDV persistence in the oro-pharynx of pigs. Therefore, pigs were vaccinated (O1 Manisa) and challenged (O1 UKG) in a manner calculated to produce a broad range of clinical outcomes and were monitored for a minimum of another 33 days post-challenge. Eighty-one percent of the early (10 days vaccinated) challenged pigs and 25% of the late (29 days vaccinated) challenged pigs were clinically infected and all other vaccinated pigs were sub-clinically infected. Although vaccination could not provide complete clinical or virological protection, it reduced the severity of the disease, virus excretion and production of non-structural FMDV antibodies in vaccinated and subsequently infected pigs. As hypothesised, vaccine-induced reduction of virus replication and excretion was found to be correlated to the severity of clinical disease. RNA copies, but no live virus was detected from the pharyngeal and soft palate tissues of a minority of vaccinated and infected pigs beyond the acute stage of the infection.</P></DIV></p>
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		<title>[구제역] 호주정부의 구제역 FAQs</title>
		<link>http://www.chsc.or.kr/?post_type=reference&#038;p=2647</link>
		<comments>http://www.chsc.or.kr/?post_type=reference&#038;p=2647#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Jan 2011 19:03:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>건강과대안</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[식품 · 의약품]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FMD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[protective vaccination]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stamping out]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[구제역]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[매몰작업]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[백신]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[살처분]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[인수공통전염병]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[호주정부는 구제역이&#160;아주 드물게 인간에게 전염되지만 증상은 아주 약하다. 구제역은 공중보건 상의 문제로 고려되지 않는다.(&#160;People are rarely affected by FMD virus and if so, the symptoms are mild. FMD [...]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><P>호주정부는 구제역이&nbsp;아주 드물게 인간에게 전염되지만 증상은 아주 약하다. 구제역은 공중보건 상의 문제로 고려되지 않는다.(&nbsp;<EM>People are rarely affected by FMD virus and if so, the symptoms are mild. FMD is not considered a public health problem.)</EM>고 자국의 국민들에게 확실한 과학적 정보를 제공하고 있습니다.<BR><BR>구체역의 인체 감염은 구제역에 감염된 가축을&nbsp;다루는 중에&nbsp; 또는&nbsp;실험실에서 피부 상처를 통해 일어날 수 있으며, 구제역에 감염된 우유를 마시면서 입을 통해서 일어날 수 있다(Infection can occur through skin wounds by handling diseased stock or the virus in the laboratory (no Australian laboratory holds infective FMD virus), or through the mouth lining by drinking infected milk.)는 사실도 공개하고 있습니다.</P><br />
<P>이러한 과학적 정보를 제공한 후에 감염된 가축의 고기를 섭취하거나 다른 축산제품을 소비함으로써 구제역에 감염되지는 않는다고 밝히고 있습니다.<BR><BR>그리고 구제역의 인체감염은 일시적이며, 경증이고, 아주 드문 경우에만 임상적으로 질병(열, 손과 발 또는 입에 수포)이 나타난다는 사실도 알려주고 있습니다.<BR><BR>호주 정부의 구제역 방역의 기본 방침은 살처분(stamping out)이며, 특정한 상황에서 백신정책을<BR>도입할 수 있다고 밝히고 있습니다. 그럼에도 불구하고 구제역 백신접종을 한 동물들을 모두<BR>살처분한다고 분명히 밝히고 있습니다. 호주에서는 구제역 백신 접종 후 그 동물들을 살리기 위한<BR>보호적 백신(protective vaccination)을 금지하고 있습니다.<BR></P><br />
<H1>FMD FAQs</H1><br />
<P><B>출처 : <A href="http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/programs/eadp/ausvetplan/fmd-response-policy-review/fmd-faqs.cfm">http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/programs/eadp/ausvetplan/fmd-response-policy-review/fmd-faqs.cfm</A><BR><BR>1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>What is FMD?</B></P><br />
<P><I>Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is an acute, highly contagious and rapidly spreading viral disease of domestic and wild cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, camelids (camels, llamas and alpacas) and buffalo. </I></P><br />
<P>The disease is characterised by the formation of vesicles (fluid-filled blisters) and erosions in the mouth and nostrils, on the teats, and on the skin between and above the hoofs. The disease spreads extremely rapidly through populations of susceptible animals. FMD may cause serious production losses and is a major constraint to international trade in livestock and their products.</P><br />
<P>Mortality in adult cattle is usually low to negligible, but up to 50% of calves may die.&nbsp; Significant mortality can also occur in piglets, and although the disease is usually mild in sheep and goats, significant mortality can occur in lambs.</P><br />
<P>There is no specific treatment for FMD. With severe disease and particularly if there are severe secondary infections and complications, animals may have to be culled because of welfare reasons.</P><br />
<P><B>2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>What is Australia’s FMD status?</B></P><br />
<P><I>Australia is free from FMD; FMD is ‘exotic’ to Australia.</I></P><br />
<P>Minor outbreaks of possible FMD occurred in 1801, 1804, 1871 and 1872. The last incident occurred in Victoria following the importation of a bull from England. Two farms were involved before the disease was eradicated. FMD has not been diagnosed in Australia since then.</P><br />
<P><B>3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>Why are we so worried about FMD?</B></P><br />
<P><I>An FMD outbreak would result in the immediate closure of many of Australia’s major export markets for livestock and livestock products. </I></P><br />
<P>The economic effects of an outbreak of FMD, even on a small scale, would be enormous to individuals, to the farming industry as a whole, and to subsidiary and support industries.</P><br />
<P>There would be significant flow-on losses to the economy, including to many businesses that rely on livestock industry revenue in rural and regional Australia. In 2002, the Productivity Commission concluded that, overall, the estimated cumulative loss to the national economy would be about $2–3 billion in gross domestic product for a short outbreak, rising to $8–13 billion for a 12-month outbreak.</P><br />
<P><B>4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>Where in the world does FMD occur?</B></P><br />
<P><I>FMD is endemic throughout the Middle East, Africa, Asia and most of South America. </I></P><br />
<P>Among Australia’s closest neighbours, Indonesia, Singapore, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and the Pacific island nations are free from FMD. Parts of Malaysia are also free. However, FMD is found as close to Australia as in parts of the Philippines.</P><br />
<P><B>5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>What is Australia doing to keep FMD out of livestock?</B></P><br />
<P><I>Australia has strict quarantine controls in place to keep FMD out. There is also a ban on feeding swill to pigs and strong encouragement of on-farm biosecurity practices.</I></P><br />
<P>Australia does not allow imports of any susceptible live animals, semen or uncooked meat or unprocessed dairy products from FMD-affected countries or zones.</P><br />
<P>Australia also invests in other activities ‘at source’. For example, Australian overseas aid programs include an FMD eradication campaign in Southeast Asia (OIE Southeast Asia Foot and Mouth Disease Campaign) and a specific FMD control program in the Philippines. The Australian government also runs the Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy, aimed at early detection of exotic disease in high-risk areas of northern Australia. The strategy has an offshore component that includes periodic disease surveys in West Papua, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea. These activities provide added knowledge and assist in risk management.</P><br />
<P>Pigs shed about a thousand times more virus than other susceptible animals and are the major amplifying host for the disease. Pigs are mainly infected through eating contaminated meat products but are then very efficient at multiplying and spreading the virus through aerosols, thus spreading the disease to other animals. Many FMD outbreaks have originated from swill feeding of pigs with infected animal products or meat scraps from infected animals.&nbsp; <B>It is illegal to feed swill to pigs in Australia. </B></P><br />
<P>Transmission occurs most readily when animals are in close proximity, such as at watering and feeding points, stockyards and milking sheds. Spread of infection between properties and areas is often due to the movement of infected animals or contaminated vehicles, equipment, people and products. Infected animals can shed virus up to four days before clinical signs become apparent so animal movement can be a big factor in the spread of FMD. Simple on-farm biosecurity measures can minimise the risk of spreading disease, including FMD.</P><br />
<P><B>6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>Given FMD is exotic to Australia, how could we get it in? </B></P><br />
<P><I>The most significant risk of entry of FMD to Australia is through illegal entry of meat and dairy products which could find their way into the livestock population.</I></P><br />
<P>The virus can survive for long periods in a variety of fresh, partly cooked, cured and smoked meat products, and in inadequately heat-treated dairy products which could find their way into the livestock population and cause an outbreak of FMD (as happened in the UK in 2001). These could be brought in by passengers on aircraft or ships, or could be sent through the post. There is also a risk from garbage discarded by fishing vessels or yachts.</P><br />
<P><B>7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>How easy would it be for FMD to spread in Australia?</B></P><br />
<P><I>FMD has the potential to become established in Australian cattle, pig, sheep and goat populations; unless diagnosed and responded to very early, FMD could spread rapidly throughout Australia especially through movement of infected livestock. </I></P><br />
<P>Australia has large populations of domestic and feral animals that are fully susceptible to infection with FMD virus, including intensively managed animals in dairies and piggeries, animals in more extensive cattle and sheep enterprises, and feral pigs, cattle, goats, camels and buffalo.</P><br />
<P>Long-distance windborne spread of infection, except where piggeries are involved, is unlikely in most, if not all, of the country. However, the disease could be spread very rapidly through livestock saleyards, and by the movement of animals, contaminated trucks or other items.</P><br />
<P><B>8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>Can people get infected with FMD virus?</B></P><br />
<P><I>People are rarely affected by FMD virus and if so, the symptoms are mild. FMD is not considered a public health problem.</I></P><br />
<P>Infection can occur through skin wounds by handling diseased stock or the virus in the laboratory (no Australian laboratory holds infective FMD virus), or through the mouth lining by drinking infected milk. People cannot be infected by eating meat or consuming other products from affected animals.</P><br />
<P>The infection is temporary and mild, only very occasionally resulting in clinical disease (fever, vesicles on the hands, feet or in the mouth).&nbsp;</P><br />
<P>‘Hand, foot and mouth disease’ of humans (most often caused by Coxsackievirus type A16) is present in Australia and may be confused clinically with FMD; it is not the same disease.</P><br />
<P><B>9.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>What would we do if we had an outbreak of FMD?</B></P><br />
<P><I>FMD is highly contagious and Australia’s control and eradication procedures include strict movement controls and the destruction of infected and at risk animals. </I></P><br />
<P>Australia’s response policy for an outbreak of FMD is to control and eradicate the disease through stamping out and to re-establish the FMD-free status of Australia as quickly as possible. It is described in detail in AUSVETPLAN, Australia’s Veterinary Emergency Plan [link to AUSVETPLAN].<I></I></P><br />
<P>Stamping out involves culling of all susceptible animals on infected premises and dangerous contact premises, regardless of whether the animals are infected or not. ‘Susceptible animals’ would include all cattle, pigs, sheep, goats and camelids on those premises.</P><br />
<P>Our response policy to an FMD outbreak also states: ‘<I>Although it could extend market disruption, vaccination may be used in certain circumstances (for example, if the disease spreads beyond the limit of the available resources to control it; or to protect large animal concentrations, limit infection and minimise virus production</I>)’; however, it qualifies that ‘Vaccinates must ultimately be slaughtered out’, essentially not permitting protective vaccination (‘vaccinate to live’).</P></p>
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		<title>[구제역] 호주정부의 구제역 백신 FAQs</title>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Jan 2011 18:22:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>건강과대안</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[식품 · 의약품]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FMD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[protective vaccination]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stamping out]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[suppressive vaccination]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vaccinate to die]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vaccinate to live]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vaccination]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[구제역]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[매몰작업]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[백신]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[살처분]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Vaccination FAQs 출처 : http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/programs/eadp/ausvetplan/fmd-response-policy-review/vaccination-faqs.cfm1.&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160; Are there FMD control options other than stamping out? Yes. Especially since the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001 when almost [...]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><H1>Vaccination FAQs</H1><br />
<P><B>출처 : <A href="http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/programs/eadp/ausvetplan/fmd-response-policy-review/vaccination-faqs.cfm">http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/programs/eadp/ausvetplan/fmd-response-policy-review/vaccination-faqs.cfm</A><BR><BR>1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>Are there FMD control options other than stamping out?</B></P><br />
<P><I>Yes. Especially since the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001 when almost 6 million cattle were culled, research into FMD has offered alternative options, such as protective vaccination, for responding to an outbreak of FMD. </I></P><br />
<P>The FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001 was the largest in history. The UK eradicated FMD by stamping out the disease, but suffered losses of more than eight billion pounds sterling (approximately A$19 billion); the country&#8217;s livestock and tourism industries were devastated as a result.</P><br />
<P>In the same year, Uruguay also suffered an outbreak of FMD. Uruguay’s cattle population was the same as that of the UK and the number of infected herds was almost identical. However, while the UK used stamping out on its own and killed a total of 5,730,000 cattle (with 3,910,000 testing positive to FMD), Uruguay used protective vaccination (‘vaccinate to live’) to assist its eradication campaign and needed to kill only 6,937 cattle (all FMD positive).</P><br />
<P>The direct cost of the FMD outbreak in the UK was US$4.6 billion, that of Uruguay US$13 million. The total economic impact of the FMD outbreak in the UK was over US$10 billion, that of Uruguay less than US$400 million.</P><br />
<P><B>2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>Why would vaccination be considered in an FMD outbreak?</B></P><br />
<P><I>Vaccinating animals can ‘buy some time’ because it can delay or even prevent further spread of disease from the known outbreak locations. </I></P><br />
<P>The Australian response policy for an outbreak of FMD is to control and eradicate the disease through stamping out. Time is the essence here; if there are delays in carrying out the slaughter, the effectiveness of this approach is not guaranteed, and the disease can spread out of control.</P><br />
<P>There are two principal options for vaccination: protective vaccination (‘vaccinate to live’) and suppressive vaccination (vaccinate to die’). For their respective advantages and disadvantages see relevant questions.</P><br />
<P><B>3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>What &nbsp;does ‘vaccinate to live’ mean?</B></P><br />
<P><I>‘Vaccinate to live’, more appropriately called ‘protective vaccination’, means that an animal is vaccinated against a disease for the purpose of protecting it from getting ill and possibly dying. If used as part of an FMD eradication campaign, protective vaccination greatly reduces livestock losses because fewer animals get sick or need to be killed.</I></P><br />
<P>Protective vaccination is what is commonly used to protect people and animals from infectious diseases, e.g. measles, influenza, tetanus. People and animals are vaccinated when they are healthy, as a measure to prevent a future infection. In an FMD outbreak, ‘ring vaccination’ would be used, that is healthy animals in a, for example, 5 km radius around an infected premises would be vaccinated to provide a ‘buffer population’.</P><br />
<P><B>4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>What does ‘vaccinate to die’ mean?</B></P><br />
<P><I>‘Vaccinate to die’, more appropriately called ‘suppressive vaccination’, has the purpose of minimising or stopping virus shedding and&nbsp; ‘buying time’ in the eradication campaign. It may protect the animal against clinical disease, but it will not necessarily prevent infection.</I></P><br />
<P>Animals to be vaccinated under this strategy are usually those at high risk of infection, literally the ones in the middle of the outbreak. If suppressive vaccination is used as part of an FMD eradication campaign, all vaccinated animals will be killed at the end of the eradication campaign.</P><br />
<P><B>5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>How would we use vaccination? For example, would all susceptible animals be vaccinated?</B></P><br />
<P><I>The exact vaccination strategy would depend on the circumstances of the outbreak but the key parameter would always be to quickly and effectively control the outbreak with a view to restoring business continuity</I>.</P><br />
<P>Typically, if suppressive vaccination (‘vaccinate to die’) is used, animals to be vaccinated are those at high risk of infection, literally the ones in the middle of the outbreak. This is because the purpose of suppressive vaccination is to ‘buy time’ in the eradication campaign, that is to ‘suppress’ the spread of infection.</P><br />
<P>If a strategy of protective vaccination (‘vaccinate to live’) is followed, ring vaccination is typically used. This means that animals within a certain radius around infected premises are vaccinated so that a buffer population of vaccinated animals surrounds the infected premises, helping contain the outbreak and prevent it from spreading to the outside of the ring.</P><br />
<P><B>6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>Why do vaccinated animals need to be killed if suppressive vaccination is used as part of an FMD eradication campaign?</B></P><br />
<P><I>Depending on the time between vaccination and infection, vaccinated animals may not show clinical signs, but they may still carry the virus. That is why even those vaccinated animals are ultimately killed.</I></P><br />
<P>The purpose of suppressive vaccination is to ‘buy time’ in the eradication campaign, that is to ‘suppress’ the spread of infection. Animals to be vaccinated under this strategy are usually those at high risk of infection, literally the ones in the middle of the outbreak. If they’re not infected already, they’re expected to become infected. Depending on the time between vaccination and infection, they may not show clinical signs, but they may still carry the virus. That is why even those vaccinated animals are ultimately killed.</P><br />
<P>Emergency vaccination of at-risk stock (suppressive vaccination, ‘vaccinate to die’) may result in the need to destroy animals that would otherwise have avoided destruction in a conventional stamping-out approach.</P><br />
<P><B>7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>&nbsp;What are the advantages and disadvantages of protective vaccination in an FMD outbreak?</B></P><br />
<P><I>One advantage is that – while eradication is still achievable and remains the goal – far fewer numbers of healthy animals need to be killed to achieve eradication, reducing not just livestock losses but also collateral damage to </I>e.g. <I>commercial activity in rural locations. On the downside, concern is sometimes expressed that the use of protective vaccination doubles the waiting period required to regain the OIE status of FMD free country when compared to stamping out or stamping out with suppressive vaccination (6 months versus 3 months).</I></P><br />
<P>Using protective vaccination as part of the eradication campaign also means there are fewer resources required to kill animals and safely dispose of the carcases.</P><br />
<P>Not having to kill large numbers of healthy animals would attract wide community support.</P><br />
<P>Regarding regaining freedom from FMD, in reality, the OIE does not determine the length of trade exclusion. The point in time following eradication of FMD when export trade resumes will be determined between Australia and its trading partners; regardless what eradication strategy is chosen, exclusion of some commodities from some export markets will most likely last for at least 12 months.</P><br />
<P><B>8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>Has protective vaccination ever been used effectively in an FMD outbreak?</B></P><br />
<P><I>Yes, for example by Uruguay in 2001, the same year that the UK had an FMD outbreak and used stamping out on its own. The Uruguay outbreak lasted 18 weeks, half as long as the UK outbreak, and the total economic impact was less than 4% of that in the UK.</I></P><br />
<P>Uruguay’s cattle population was the same as that of the UK at the time of the 2001 outbreak and the number of infected herds was almost identical. However, while the UK used stamping out on its own and killed a total of 5,730,000 cattle (with 3,910,000 testing positive to FMD), Uruguay used protective vaccination to assist its eradication campaign and needed to kill only 6,937 cattle (all FMD positive).</P><br />
<P>The direct cost of the FMD outbreak in the UK was US$4.6 billion, that of Uruguay US$13 million.</P><br />
<P>The total economic impact of the FMD outbreak in the UK was over US$10 billion, that of Uruguay less than US$400 million.</P><br />
<P><B>9.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>Does Australia have FMD vaccine available?</B></P><br />
<P><I>In Australia, governments and livestock industries have invested in FMD vaccine supply arrangements.</I></P><br />
<P>A supply contract with a commercial manufacturer has been secured over 5 years (ending in 2014) to provide 500 000 cattle-equivalent doses of any of nine FMD strains within 7 business days of notification. This number of doses has been calculated to be sufficient in the early stages of a response but will be supplemented by further purchases if needed.</P><br />
<P><B>10.&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>What are ‘DIVA tests’?</B></P><br />
<P><I>DIVA stands for ‘<SPAN style="TEXT-DECORATION: underline">D</SPAN>ifferentiating <SPAN style="TEXT-DECORATION: underline">I</SPAN>nfected from <SPAN style="TEXT-DECORATION: underline">V</SPAN>accinated <SPAN style="TEXT-DECORATION: underline">A</SPAN>nimals’.</I></P><br />
<P>If animals are vaccinated against FMD, they will – for a period of time – give a positive result in blood tests. However, the animal could also be infected with ‘real’ FMD virus. Standard tests cannot tell the difference between a positive result due to vaccination and a positive result due to actual FMD infection.</P><br />
<P>FMD DIVA tests are tests that can determine whether an animal that tests positive to FMD screening tests does so because it is infected with FMD virus or because it is vaccinated.</P><br />
<P><B>11.&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>What is the relevance of ‘DIVA’ testing for FMD vaccination?</B></P><br />
<P><I>DIVA tests are needed to demonstrate FMD disease freedom after an FMD outbreak has been eradicated when protective vaccination has been part of the response. </I></P><br />
<P>Before we can claim success that we have eradicated an FMD outbreak, we need to demonstrate that there are no animals left that are infected with FMD virus. This is done by laboratory tests of samples taken from animals in the ‘proof of freedom’ phase after the outbreak.</P><br />
<P>If animals are vaccinated against FMD, they will – for a period of time – give a positive test result for FMD.</P><br />
<P>Under Australia’s current FMD response policy, suppressive vaccination (‘vaccinate to die’) is possible under certain circumstances. Under that policy, all vaccinated animals would be killed during the eradication campaign, that is, there would be no vaccinated animals still alive in the ‘proof of freedom’ phase. Therefore, any animals testing positive in the ‘proof of freedom’ phase would be considered as infected (which means eradication wasn’t as yet successful).</P><br />
<P>If vaccinated animals have been allowed to live (‘vaccinate to live’; protective vaccination), standard tests cannot tell the difference between a positive result due to vaccination and a positive result due to actual FMD infection. This is where DIVA tests are required, that is, tests that differentiate infected from vaccinated animals.</P><br />
<P><B>12.&nbsp;&nbsp; </B><B>How long would it take for Australia to regain its FMD-free status after an outbreak?</B></P><br />
<P><I>The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) recognises Australia as a country ‘free from FMD without vaccination’. According to the OIE standards, the waiting periods – after a successful eradication campaign – required to regain the OIE status of FMD free country are 3 months when stamping out or stamping out with suppressive vaccination (‘vaccinate to die’) has been used, and 6 months when stamping out with protective vaccination (‘vaccinate to live’) has been followed.</I></P><br />
<P>For Australia to regain its FMD-free status as quickly as possible (in 3 months rather than 6 months), it would be necessary for a stamping-out policy to apply and – if suppressive vaccination has been used – for all vaccinated animals to be destroyed, in line with the OIE standards. Emergency vaccination of at-risk stock (suppressive vaccination, ‘vaccinate to die’) may result in the need to destroy animals that would otherwise have avoided destruction in a conventional stamping-out approach.</P><br />
<P>In reality, the OIE does not determine the length of trade exclusion. The point in time following eradication of FMD when export trade resumes will be determined between Australia and its trading partners; regardless what eradication strategy is chosen, exclusion of some commodities from some export markets will most likely last for at least 12 months.</P></p>
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