VZCZCXYZ0000

PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1524/01 2140707

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 010707Z AUG 08

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1073

INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4570

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8868

RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4695

RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 2768

RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI

RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA

RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR

RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR

RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001524 

SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KN KS

SUBJECT: DP CHAIRMAN CHUNG SE-KYUN ON FTA, BEEF 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador made a July 23 courtesy call

on newly elected Democratic Party (DP) Chairman Chung

Se-kyun.  During the cordial meeting, conducted entirely in

English, the two discussed prospects for ratification of the

KORUS FTA.  Chung said the DP was prepared to support FTA

ratification, but with two conditions:  that the ROKG provide

adequate adjustment assistance for those affected by the FTA;

and that there be some sign of progress with U.S.

Congressional ratification, including possibly President Bush

sending the agreement to Congress for ratification.  The

Ambassador noted that while the Administration was working

hard to build Congressional support for KORUS, prompt

ratification by Korea’s National Assembly could help that

process, whereas a delay by Korea could lead some KORUS

opponents to say “Korea’s clearly in no rush either.”  On

beef, Chung said the DP’s position was that the bilateral

beef agreement should be changed, and that Korea’s Animal

Disease Law should also be amended to address concerns about

U.S. beef.  The Ambassador noted we would have to agree to

disagree on that:  U.S. beef is safe, is tested at a higher

rate than required by the OIE, and our bilateral agreement is

consistent with international scientific standards.  Asked

about possible constitutional amendments, Chung noted that

with just 81 members in the 299-seat legislature, the DP was

in poor position to negotiate on possible amendments, and

would wait until it had a stronger voice in the Assembly

before pursuing amendments.  During the prolonged photo spray

to start the cordial meeting, the two discussed the FTA, and

Chung noted that the Ambassador had dealt with many headaches

during his tenure, including North Korea, beef and alliance

issues.  The Ambassador noted that the two countries had

addressed those through our shared will to strengthen the

alliance, and that had applied to our productive relationship

with former President Roh just as it applied to our good

relationship with current President Lee Myung-bak.  END

SUMMARY 
—

FTA

— 
¶2.  (C) In a July 23 meeting, Democratic Party Chairman Chung

Se-kyun said the DP was prepared to support FTA ratification

by Korea’s National Assembly.  The GNP majority could ratify

the FTA on its own, he said, but “the Democratic Party will

agree, with terms and conditions — there will be no

obstacles on the Korean side.”  Those two conditions were

that assistance be provided to the affected agriculture

sectors in Korea — something he noted had already been

prepared by the Agriculture Ministry, and “should not be a

big problem” — and some progress with U.S. Congressional

ratification, such as President Bush sending the agreement to

Congress for ratification.  The Ambassador said he was

pleased to hear of DP support for the KORUS FTA, since it

would be a disappointment if the party that negotiated the

FTA wouldn’t support it.  Chung agreed, and said that

provided its conditions were met, “the Opposition party won’t

just say no.” 
¶3.  (C) Turning to timing, Chung said that since the KORUS

FTA had already been sent to the previous 17th National

Assembly and debated extensively, “if both sides are willing

to ratify the FTA, we can do it in two weeks.”   Ideally, the

U.S. Congress could keep pace with the Korean legislature so

there would be “balance” to the process and no long gap

between passage in Korea and in the U.S.   Chung lamented

that in the relevant U.S. bills and the agreement itself was

still with the Bush Administration and had not been submitted

to the Congress for review, let alone ratification.  The

Ambassador said that while the Administration was working

hard to build Congressional support for the FTA, if Korea

ratified the agreement, it could help those efforts to get

the KORUS FTA on the Congressional agenda.  If Korea waited,

KORUS opponents in the U.S. would say that “clearly, Korea is

in no hurry” — that would be cited as an excuse not to vote

on the FTA.  Moreover, given the complex pre-negotiation with

Congress that occurred before sending an FTA to Congress for

a vote, it could be hard to control the dynamic interaction

that goes on before officially sending the KORUS FTA to

Congress.  Clearly it would be in no one’s interest for us to

do so unless we were confident the votes to approve were

there.  Chung remarked that he expected lawmakers in the U.S.

to be swayed more by their constituents than by the actions

of the Korean legislature.  Therefore, he and others in Korea

had little confidence that ratifying the FTA in Korea would

serve as a catalyst for passage in the U.S. 
¶4.  (C) Chung said it worried him and many Koreans that

Democratic presidential candidate Obama has expressed an

anti-FTA stance.  The Ambassador replied that Senator Obama

was currently one of 100 Senators, and while his vote was

important, we were hopeful that if a vote could be scheduled,

the KORUS FTA could win the necessary majorities in both the

House and Senate.  Chung concluded the discussion of FTA

ratification by saying Korea would try to work on that

legislation in August, and asked, “If Korea acts first on FTA

ratification, do you think there will be responsive action by

the U.S. Congress?”  The Ambassador noted that we hoped so,

and that action by Korea would take away excuses from the

KORUS skeptics. 
—-

BEEF

—- 
¶5. (C) Chung said that the DP was not happy with the beef

agreement the two governments had reached.  “Our position,”

Chung explained, “is that there are some major problems in

the agreement that need to be improved or changed.”

Additionally, the DP hoped to amend the Animal Disease Law

(in order to limit imports of U.S. beef). The DP’s view was

that any new laws would take precedence over previous

announcements or agreements made by ministers or vice

ministers; the beef agreement had not been signed by the

president so Chung said his party’s view was that the

agreement could be overruled by an act of the Assembly.

Chung compared this to the KORUS FTA, which he said had been

signed by President Roh and so could not be amended  (when

reminded that former Trade Minister Kim Hyun-chong had

actually signed the KORUS FTA for Korea, Chung said that he

meant President Roh had signed it ceremonially). 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador said we would have to agree to

disagree on beef.  We had worked hard over two months to

react to the situation and come up with solutions to address

people’s concerns.  We thought some of those concerns were

exaggerated, but they were real, so we took steps to meet

them in USTR Schwab’s exchange of letters with Trade Minister

Kim and in the “additional negotiations.”  Those represented

solemn commitments.  Both sides wanted to avoid renegotiation

because it would inevitably lead to calls to renegotiate the

FTA.  In addition, U.S. beef was safe so the current

agreement was appropriate.  Chung said many in Korea were

upset that the Korean beef agreement was different than the

U.S. agreements with Japan and Taiwan.  The Ambassador

replied that the current U.S. beef agreements with those two

economies pre-dated the U.S. designation as a “controlled

risk” country by the OIE, but added the U.S. was working on

new agreements with the two economies that would be modeled

on the Korean agreement. 
———–

NORTH KOREA

———– 
¶7.  (C) Chung asked if negotiations with North Korea on

denuclearization were proceeding well.  The Ambassador said

that, though six months behind schedule, progress had been

made on disablement of Youngbyon and the DPRK’s declaration

of its nuclear programs.  Now it was necessary to verify the

DPRK declaration and work to eliminate its nuclear weapons in

phase 3. 
————————

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

———————— 
¶8.  (C) Replying to the Ambassador’s query about the

possibility of a Constitutional amendment, Chung said that

the DP, with just 81 members, was in a poor position to

negotiate on any possible amendment, so the party would aim

to wait and amend the Constitution when the DP had a stronger

voice.  He noted there were many opinions on when and whether

the Constitution should be amended; some in his own party

were calling for immediate discussion of amendments (such as

changing to two four-year Presidential terms or changing to a

Parliamentary system).  Pro-Park Geun-hye lawmakers were also

for starting work to amend the Constitution soon, Chung said,

while those loyal to President Lee hoped to delay

discussions. 
——-

COMMENT

——- 
¶10.  (C) Chung was Minister of Commerce and Industry (MOCIE

– precursor to the current Ministry of Knowledge Economy)

from February to December 2006 under former President Roh,

and was an important proponent of the KORUS FTA.  As leader

of the main opposition party, this should be a boon for us,

and it was encouraging to hear that his concerns about timing

notwithstanding, he was unequivocally supportive of KORUS FTA

ratification.  Unfortunately, the opposition is more

factionalized than the ruling GNP, and his voice is not

necessarily the voice of the party.  Opinion polls continue

to show majority public support for the FTA in Korea;

however, there is also increasing concern among political

circles in Seoul that given the steady stream of negative

reports on KORUS’s prospects in Congress, the National

Assembly might do well to await some indication of meaningful

progress in the U.S. ratification debate before taking a

tough vote to ratify the KORUS FTA here in Korea.

VERSHBOW