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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001087 

SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KN KS

SUBJECT: LEE SANG-DEUK ON BEEF, PRESIDENT LEE’S MISSTEPS 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: Over a lunch of U.S. beef, the Ambassador

and Vice Speaker Lee, who is President Lee Myung-bak’s elder

brother, discussed solutions to the continuing controversy

over the planned reopening of the Korean market to U.S. beef.

 Vice Speaker Lee and recently reelected lawmaker Chun Yu-ok

were pessimistic the controversy would subside soon, but

optimistic that U.S. beef would soon reenter the market.  Lee

suggested it might be politically better for the Lee

government to delay the official opening until after the June

4 by-elections.  If not, a sweeping defeat for GNP candidates

could damage future ROKG initiatives.  Because progressive,

anti-American, and pro-DPRK leaders had directed the ROKG and

the Korean media for the last ten years, it was difficult now

for President Lee to overcome media bias and well-organized

leftist groups to resolve the beef issue.  He thought,

however, the situation would be easier once the

GNP-controlled National Assembly started its session in June.

 Both the Vice Speaker and pro-MB lawmaker Chun Yu-ok

acknowledged that President Lee had made some mistakes that

had contributed to people’s dissatisfaction with his

Administration.  Most of the President’s missteps they

attributed to President Lee’s lack of “political instinct.”

They both also expressed disappointment in Park Geun-hye and

other conservative leaders for not supporting President Lee

on beef and other issues.  Lee emphasized that U.S. support

was key to helping the ROKG overcome the beef problem.  Vice

Speaker Lee said that President Lee was pro-U.S. and

pro-Japan to the core so there should be no questioning

President Lee’s vision.  Ultimately, President Lee would do

right by the alliance and work well with both the U.S. and

Japan.  Lee said that the main task in the new National

Assembly would be to pass the KORUS FTA.  END SUMMARY 
—————-

BEEF CONTROVERSY

—————- 
¶2.  (C) During a pleasant lunch with President Lee’s elder

brother Lee Sang-deuk, the Ambassador asked if there was some

way to diffuse the controversy surrounding the reopening of

the Korean market to U.S. beef.  Vice Speaker Lee explained

that the “386 generation” focused on anti-American, pro-DPRK,

pro-Unification policies while younger Koreans are now

protesting against U.S. beef with a different motive.

Despite the different motive, the ideology of the 386-ers had

influenced the young people protesting the reopening of the

Korean market to U.S. beef imports.  While ten years ago some

felt that the U.S. was more of an enemy than North Korea, now

young people are worried about finding a job.  While some

worry that anti-beef sentiment could spiral into anti-U.S.

sentiment, Lee thought that once U.S. beef was available in

Korean stores, anti-beef protests would subside.  Eventually,

as holdovers from the anti-American/pro-DPRK period

(1998-2008 Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung presidencies) were

pushed out of positions of power and influence, such issues

would cease to be big problems. 
¶3.  (C) Lee said he was concerned that if the beef agreement

were finalized to allow imports of U.S. beef to begin

entering Korea before the June 4 by-election, it could become

the main election issue and cause GNP candidates to lose.

This would deal a heavy blow to President Lee.  Therefore,

waiting until after the election to finalize the agreement

would be helpful.  The Ambassador said waiting until after

the election would damage Korea’s credibility in the U.S.

Congress since there had already been delays.  Lee replied

that if there were trust between the governments, one more

small delay due to real political concerns should not make

much difference.  Rep. Chun disagreed with Lee and said she

thought it would be better to keep the current date and start

beef imports.  Lee conceded that he originally wanted the

beef market to reopen as quickly as possible so people could

eat U.S. beef but had changed his mind recently because of

the potential loss in the by-election. 
—————————

CONSERVATIVES BACK IN POWER

————————— 
¶4.  (C) Lee said the conservatives won the December

presidential and April National Assembly elections

convincingly, but some conservatives were disappointed by

President Lee’s focus on pragmatism at the expense of

traditional conservative principles.  Due to disappointment

with Lee, many of the pro-U.S. conservatives, such as Park

Geun-hye and her supporters, were not interested in helping

Lee handle his latest crisis.  Representative Chun added that

conservatives should thank President Lee for succeeding in

changing the government.  She admitted, however, that Lee

Myung-bak’s over-emphasis on pragmatism was a mistake, and

the disappointment of some conservatives was regrettable but

understandable. 
———————

INTRA-PARTY STRUGGLES

——————— 
¶5.  (C) Because the April 9 National Assembly elections were

just 45 days after Lee Myung-bak’s February 25 inauguration,

the public intra-party struggle was inevitable, Lee lamented.

 Compounding the issue, some Lee Myung-bak supporters had

tried to monopolize power by dominating the nomination

process.  Lee said he had put a brake on this movement, which

led certain GNP lawmakers to sign a petition against his

nomination.  These people have since apologized, Lee said.

Chun said some were opposed to Lee Sang-deuk remaining in the

National Assembly, but because Lee has an important role to

play, she had defended the choice to nominate Lee. 
¶6.  (C) Lee said that he was meeting traditional conservative

leaders on behalf of President Lee to try to smooth over

differences and convince them to support the President.  Both

Chun and Lee were not optimistic, however, that the pro-Park

lawmakers could assimilate well into the GNP and support

President Lee, even if their party membership were

reinstated.  Chun said that the likely scenario would result

in President Lee fighting not only the opposition party but

also the pro-Park lawmakers within the GNP.  Chun said the

reason she was pessimistic was that the pro-Park lawmakers

had been critical of the ROKG regarding the beef agreement. 
——————————–

FANNING THE FLAMES OF DISCONTENT

——————————– 
¶7.  (C) Before President Lee settled into office and “found

his place,” there was a struggle over nominations and

controversy surrounding beef, Lee said.  Compounding these

problems, Lee appointed a group of rich, U.S.-educated Blue

House senior secretaries and did not understand why Korean

people would rally against such appointments.  President Lee

kicked off his term without assessing the situation and

making concessions as needed.  The reason for this, Lee said,

was that President Lee has “poor political instinct” since he

had not been directly involved in Korean politics for very

long.  Worse still, many of President Lee’s close aides had

also never run for the National Assembly.  Therefore, neither

President Lee nor his aides were able to imagine the problems

that arose. 
————————————-

ROK: PRO-U.S., PRO-JAPAN, NOT PRO-PRC

————————————- 
¶8.  (C) Lee said that the lack of outrage over the Chinese

students who attacked some Koreans should not be a worry to

the U.S. since Lee Myung-bak was not pro-PRC.  There is a

broad base built up over the decades fighting the

dictatorships in Korea and supporting pro-DPRK policies, Lee

said.  USG leaders should realize that it will take time for

conservatives to unite and overcome this entrenched

organization. 
¶9.  (C) Chun pointed out that the ROK was closer to the U.S.

than to China due to recent history and this explained why

Koreans reacted more vehemently to the beef controversy than

to the violence by Chinese students.  Chun pointed out that

conflicts between close friends or family members can be the

most severe.  Also, the fact that Japan belonged to the visa

waiver program and the ROK did not contributed to sensitivity

on all issues American.  Chun said her daughter recently

returned from study in the U.S. and wondered why there was a

debate over U.S. beef.  More Koreans needed to have the

chance to go to the U.S. to dispel myths about the U.S. and

about U.S. beef, Chun concluded. 
¶10.  (C) The Ambassador said that President Lee was

respected, more in the U.S. than he was on April 18, when the

beef agreement was signed, because people now see how

difficult his decision was in light of the resultant domestic

opposition.  The Ambassador assured Lee that the USG

appreciated President Lee’s firm support of the U.S. and that

the highest levels of the USG, especially President Bush,

were sensitive to the political situation in Korea and would

not press for controversial decisions while the situation

remained difficult.  President Bush said during the summit

that no issue was a litmus test for the U.S.-ROK relationship

since the USG understood there were domestic concerns

influencing the handling of sensitive issues. 
¶11.  (C) Representative Lee said that President Lee Myung-bak

is pro-U.S. but there are still some pro-DPRK elements in the

press and in business.  Therefore, the U.S. needs to help

President Lee until these elements are replaced naturally

over time.  Some doubted President Lee, but Lee said he knew

Lee’s fundamental views were pro-U.S. and pro-Japan. 
——-

COMMENT

——- 
¶13.  (C) Vice Speaker Lee is considered the most influential

lawmaker in the National Assembly due to his relationship

with President Lee and his status as the most senior

conservative legislator.  The frustration with and criticism

of his brother, however, reflected an underlying tension

between the two.  National Assembly sources note that

President Lee asked his elder brother not to run for National

Assembly and was hurt when Lee ignored his advice and ran for

a sixth term.  This could have contributed to President Lee

ignoring the more politically astute Vice Speaker’s views on

matters of personnel and politics.  A long-time proponent of

compromise, Lee has the authority and know-how to help his

brother address complaints about how he is running the

country.  The big question is whether President Lee will

accept the help.

VERSHBOW