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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001058 

SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION

TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN

SUBJECT: FORMER FM SONG: PHASED APPROACH FOR BEEF IS THE

BEST SOLUTION 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4(b/d) 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a May 22 luncheon meeting with the

Ambassador, National Assembly member-elect (and former

Foreign Minister) Song Min-soon said that it was up to the

U.S. to find a way out of the current beef situation and

recommended a phased opening of the beef market (as the Roh

administration had proposed late last year) as the only way

to assuage the liberal United Democratic Party’s (UDP)

concerns.  Song said that Koreans were caught off guard at

the abrupt announcement of the reopening of the Korean market

to U.S. beef and were concerned that the necessary safety

measures were not included in the agreement.  If their

concerns about beef were not addressed, Song said that the

UDP would be forced to oppose ratification of the KORUS FTA,

despite many members’ support for the agreement.  Turning to

North Korea, Song said that the DPRK might be willing to make

a deal with the U.S. while President Bush was in office to

move forward on phase three of the denuclearization agreement

if the terms were “very good,” but they were more likely to

wait for a new U.S. administration.  On South Korea’s

relations with the North, Song said that he perceived a

discrepancy between President Lee’s approach to the North and

the harder-line views of the Blue House staff — a difference

that Kim Jong-il would try to exploit to the fullest.  END

SUMMARY. 
——————————————–

BEEF SOLUTION SHOULD INCLUDE PHASED APPROACH

——————————————– 
¶2. (C) In a luncheon meeting with the Ambassador on May 22,

National Assembly member-elect (and former Foreign Minister)

Song Min-soon said that he was tactfully working to prevent

the current beef issue from becoming an anti-U.S. issue.

According to Song, Koreans felt that the beef agreement

appeared to be a hastily concluded deal designed to pave the

way for a positive summit between the two Presidents.  Song

quoted Gordon Hewitt, a British judge, who said “justice

should not only be done, but also clearly be seen as being

done,” to illustrate how Koreans felt ignored in the run-up

to the final beef agreement.  Most Koreans were caught off

guard because they expected a phased approach that would

first open the Korean market to U.S. beef less than 30 months

of age, with beef over 30 months of age being approved at a

later date.  This, Song said, would allow time for broader

safety concerns to subside.  The Ambassador explained that

there was no scientific basis for a two-stage approach; while

such an approach might have worked last year, we needed a

full market opening to ensure FTA ratification this year in

the U.S. Congress. 
¶3. (C) Song said that he had tried to lay the groundwork for

a successful beef agreement during his tenure as Foreign

Minister.  When he talked with members of Lee Myung-bak’s

transition team and suggested that they hold a special

meeting with ROKG officials to discuss the handling of the

beef issue, Song said his suggestions fell on deaf ears.

Instead, the new administration just “punched their way into

office” and were unwilling to heed outside advice, Song

lamented.  Song recounted President Roh’s phone conversation

with President Bush March 29, 2007, when the two discussed

the way forward on beef on the eve of the conclusion of the

KORUS FTA negotiations on April 2.  According to Song,

President Roh told President Bush that after the OIE made its

ruling, U.S. beef would not be treated unfairly in the Korean

market.  He pointed out that the uproar over the April 18

agreement was due in part to the agreement going further than

Roh had pledged without sufficient explanation.  Song said

that President Roh had planned to resolve the issue by the

end of 2007 in a manner that would not appear as though the

U.S. had “strong-armed” Korea into the deal, but he was

unable to do so. (COMMENT: This seriously downgrades what Roh

actually promised in March 2007, which was to “respect” the

OIG’s scientific guidelines. END COMMENT) 
————————-

BEEF LINKAGE TO KORUS FTA

————————- 
¶4. (C) Song said that although the beef deal may have helped

the KORUS FTA’s prospects in the U.S., it was having the

opposite effect in Korea.  Song said that beef and the FTA

should not be linked and that they had been dealt with

separately up until now.  The Ambassador said that the U.S.

had agreed not to include beef market opening in the FTA, but

to treat it as a matter of food safety, on the understanding

that it would be resolved on the basis of science and fact.

If the U.S. were to now change the agreement based on other

factors, U.S. industry representatives were likely to reject

the deal, and businesses across the board would lose trust in

the reliability of doing business with Korea. 
¶5. (C) Without changing the beef deal to include a phased

approach that would allow the UDP to get behind the deal and

save face, Song said that the UDP was not likely to support

the FTA.  “A vote for the FTA has been turned into a vote for

the beef agreement,” which UDP members could not support,

even those who had long favored the FTA.  Song inquired if

Korea’s ratification of the FTA was a requisite for U.S.

passage.  The Ambassador responded that it was not a

necessary condition but it would force the U.S. Congress to

take a more serious look at the agreement and preempt calls

to renegotiate the automobile chapter. 
—————————————

PROSPECTS OF NORTH KOREA DENUCLEARIZING

————————————— 
¶6. (C) Song said that the DPRK wanted to get de-listed from

the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism and was therefore

willing to move forward and provide a complete declaration of

its nuclear materials and programs.  Momentum created by this

declaration would likely slow as talks began on

denuclearization issues in phase three, as the level of DPRK

commitment becomes “much steeper” at that point.  Despite

this challenge, Song said that the DPRK might accept a deal

with the current U.S. administration to move forward with

phase three of the February 2007 agreement if the terms of

the deal were “very good.”  This said, Song thought that Kim

Jong-il was nervous to step into uncharted waters of giving

up his plutonium or allowing a U.S. Embassy to be opened in

Pyongyang, and he was likely to continue negotiating while

waiting to see who would become the next U.S. president. 
—————————

ROK POLICY TOWARD THE NORTH

————————— 
¶7. (C) Song characterized President Lee’s lack of willingness

to listen to members of the previous administration by

saying, “there is no one more blind than those who do not

want to see.”  Song said that he advised members of President

Lee’s transition team “not to step too far out on a limb with

regard to North Korea policy.”  Despite his advice, Song

judged the Lee team had gone too far and was having a hard

time “getting back to the trunk of the tree.”  Song said that

in his discussions with the transition team he perceived a

discrepancy between President Lee’s approach to the North and

the harder-line views of the Blue House staff — a difference

that Kim Jong-il would try to exploit to the fullest.  For

now, Korea should focus on denuclearization and let the dust

settle on North-South relations.  Once the dust settled, the

way forward would be clearer, Song said. 
¶8. (C) According to Song, Koreans wanted to see quick

progress in relations with the North and each Korean

president also should have the goal of advancing dramatically

the relations between the Koreas or, “he should not be

president.”  President Lee’s Administration was already

“under attack” by the people to do more in support of North

Korea, especially in light of the U.S. announcement that it

would provide food aid to the North.  South Korea felt that

it should be the “master” of the North and when another

country gets ahead of the South, the Korean people get

concerned. 
——-

COMMENT

——- 
¶9.  (C) Song is a savvy politician despite his protestations

that he did not know Yeoido or how to navigate in the

political world.  He proved this as he rose through the ranks

in the Roh administration despite being a “U.S. hand.”  He

has already done much to earn his spurs in the UDP by 
engineering the political attack on the Ambassador, and thus

the U.S., over a May 21 phone call between UDP Chair Sohn

Hak-kyu and the Ambassador.  A longtime U.S. expert known for

his aggressive negotiating style, Song is likely to be a

formidable opponent of the ROKG and at times the U.S. as he

works his way up the political ladder.  Assembly sources tell

us he will likely be on the Defense Committee.

VERSHBOW