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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001524 

SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KN KS

SUBJECT: DP CHAIRMAN CHUNG SE-KYUN ON FTA, BEEF 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador made a July 23 courtesy call

on newly elected Democratic Party (DP) Chairman Chung

Se-kyun.  During the cordial meeting, conducted entirely in

English, the two discussed prospects for ratification of the

KORUS FTA.  Chung said the DP was prepared to support FTA

ratification, but with two conditions:  that the ROKG provide

adequate adjustment assistance for those affected by the FTA;

and that there be some sign of progress with U.S.

Congressional ratification, including possibly President Bush

sending the agreement to Congress for ratification.  The

Ambassador noted that while the Administration was working

hard to build Congressional support for KORUS, prompt

ratification by Korea’s National Assembly could help that

process, whereas a delay by Korea could lead some KORUS

opponents to say “Korea’s clearly in no rush either.”  On

beef, Chung said the DP’s position was that the bilateral

beef agreement should be changed, and that Korea’s Animal

Disease Law should also be amended to address concerns about

U.S. beef.  The Ambassador noted we would have to agree to

disagree on that:  U.S. beef is safe, is tested at a higher

rate than required by the OIE, and our bilateral agreement is

consistent with international scientific standards.  Asked

about possible constitutional amendments, Chung noted that

with just 81 members in the 299-seat legislature, the DP was

in poor position to negotiate on possible amendments, and

would wait until it had a stronger voice in the Assembly

before pursuing amendments.  During the prolonged photo spray

to start the cordial meeting, the two discussed the FTA, and

Chung noted that the Ambassador had dealt with many headaches

during his tenure, including North Korea, beef and alliance

issues.  The Ambassador noted that the two countries had

addressed those through our shared will to strengthen the

alliance, and that had applied to our productive relationship

with former President Roh just as it applied to our good

relationship with current President Lee Myung-bak.  END

SUMMARY 
—

FTA

— 
¶2.  (C) In a July 23 meeting, Democratic Party Chairman Chung

Se-kyun said the DP was prepared to support FTA ratification

by Korea’s National Assembly.  The GNP majority could ratify

the FTA on its own, he said, but “the Democratic Party will

agree, with terms and conditions — there will be no

obstacles on the Korean side.”  Those two conditions were

that assistance be provided to the affected agriculture

sectors in Korea — something he noted had already been

prepared by the Agriculture Ministry, and “should not be a

big problem” — and some progress with U.S. Congressional

ratification, such as President Bush sending the agreement to

Congress for ratification.  The Ambassador said he was

pleased to hear of DP support for the KORUS FTA, since it

would be a disappointment if the party that negotiated the

FTA wouldn’t support it.  Chung agreed, and said that

provided its conditions were met, “the Opposition party won’t

just say no.” 
¶3.  (C) Turning to timing, Chung said that since the KORUS

FTA had already been sent to the previous 17th National

Assembly and debated extensively, “if both sides are willing

to ratify the FTA, we can do it in two weeks.”   Ideally, the

U.S. Congress could keep pace with the Korean legislature so

there would be “balance” to the process and no long gap

between passage in Korea and in the U.S.   Chung lamented

that in the relevant U.S. bills and the agreement itself was

still with the Bush Administration and had not been submitted

to the Congress for review, let alone ratification.  The

Ambassador said that while the Administration was working

hard to build Congressional support for the FTA, if Korea

ratified the agreement, it could help those efforts to get

the KORUS FTA on the Congressional agenda.  If Korea waited,

KORUS opponents in the U.S. would say that “clearly, Korea is

in no hurry” — that would be cited as an excuse not to vote

on the FTA.  Moreover, given the complex pre-negotiation with

Congress that occurred before sending an FTA to Congress for

a vote, it could be hard to control the dynamic interaction

that goes on before officially sending the KORUS FTA to

Congress.  Clearly it would be in no one’s interest for us to

do so unless we were confident the votes to approve were

there.  Chung remarked that he expected lawmakers in the U.S.

to be swayed more by their constituents than by the actions

of the Korean legislature.  Therefore, he and others in Korea

had little confidence that ratifying the FTA in Korea would

serve as a catalyst for passage in the U.S. 
¶4.  (C) Chung said it worried him and many Koreans that

Democratic presidential candidate Obama has expressed an

anti-FTA stance.  The Ambassador replied that Senator Obama

was currently one of 100 Senators, and while his vote was

important, we were hopeful that if a vote could be scheduled,

the KORUS FTA could win the necessary majorities in both the

House and Senate.  Chung concluded the discussion of FTA

ratification by saying Korea would try to work on that

legislation in August, and asked, “If Korea acts first on FTA

ratification, do you think there will be responsive action by

the U.S. Congress?”  The Ambassador noted that we hoped so,

and that action by Korea would take away excuses from the

KORUS skeptics. 
—-

BEEF

—- 
¶5. (C) Chung said that the DP was not happy with the beef

agreement the two governments had reached.  “Our position,”

Chung explained, “is that there are some major problems in

the agreement that need to be improved or changed.”

Additionally, the DP hoped to amend the Animal Disease Law

(in order to limit imports of U.S. beef). The DP’s view was

that any new laws would take precedence over previous

announcements or agreements made by ministers or vice

ministers; the beef agreement had not been signed by the

president so Chung said his party’s view was that the

agreement could be overruled by an act of the Assembly.

Chung compared this to the KORUS FTA, which he said had been

signed by President Roh and so could not be amended  (when

reminded that former Trade Minister Kim Hyun-chong had

actually signed the KORUS FTA for Korea, Chung said that he

meant President Roh had signed it ceremonially). 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador said we would have to agree to

disagree on beef.  We had worked hard over two months to

react to the situation and come up with solutions to address

people’s concerns.  We thought some of those concerns were

exaggerated, but they were real, so we took steps to meet

them in USTR Schwab’s exchange of letters with Trade Minister

Kim and in the “additional negotiations.”  Those represented

solemn commitments.  Both sides wanted to avoid renegotiation

because it would inevitably lead to calls to renegotiate the

FTA.  In addition, U.S. beef was safe so the current

agreement was appropriate.  Chung said many in Korea were

upset that the Korean beef agreement was different than the

U.S. agreements with Japan and Taiwan.  The Ambassador

replied that the current U.S. beef agreements with those two

economies pre-dated the U.S. designation as a “controlled

risk” country by the OIE, but added the U.S. was working on

new agreements with the two economies that would be modeled

on the Korean agreement. 
———–

NORTH KOREA

———– 
¶7.  (C) Chung asked if negotiations with North Korea on

denuclearization were proceeding well.  The Ambassador said

that, though six months behind schedule, progress had been

made on disablement of Youngbyon and the DPRK’s declaration

of its nuclear programs.  Now it was necessary to verify the

DPRK declaration and work to eliminate its nuclear weapons in

phase 3. 
————————

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

———————— 
¶8.  (C) Replying to the Ambassador’s query about the

possibility of a Constitutional amendment, Chung said that

the DP, with just 81 members, was in a poor position to

negotiate on any possible amendment, so the party would aim

to wait and amend the Constitution when the DP had a stronger

voice.  He noted there were many opinions on when and whether

the Constitution should be amended; some in his own party

were calling for immediate discussion of amendments (such as

changing to two four-year Presidential terms or changing to a

Parliamentary system).  Pro-Park Geun-hye lawmakers were also

for starting work to amend the Constitution soon, Chung said,

while those loyal to President Lee hoped to delay

discussions. 
——-

COMMENT

——- 
¶10.  (C) Chung was Minister of Commerce and Industry (MOCIE

– precursor to the current Ministry of Knowledge Economy)

from February to December 2006 under former President Roh,

and was an important proponent of the KORUS FTA.  As leader

of the main opposition party, this should be a boon for us,

and it was encouraging to hear that his concerns about timing

notwithstanding, he was unequivocally supportive of KORUS FTA

ratification.  Unfortunately, the opposition is more

factionalized than the ruling GNP, and his voice is not

necessarily the voice of the party.  Opinion polls continue

to show majority public support for the FTA in Korea;

however, there is also increasing concern among political

circles in Seoul that given the steady stream of negative

reports on KORUS’s prospects in Congress, the National

Assembly might do well to await some indication of meaningful

progress in the U.S. ratification debate before taking a

tough vote to ratify the KORUS FTA here in Korea.

VERSHBOW

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001273 

SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL KS

SUBJECT: PARK JIN: BEEF PROTESTS A RESULT OF “TOO MUCH

DEMOCRACY” 
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun, Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Grand National Party (GNP) Representative

Park Jin spent most of his June 18 dinner with ASD James

Shinn discussing domestic politics.  Park described the

current political situation as a “crisis,” and said the Lee

Myung-bak Administration would have to handle the upheaval

very carefully or the turmoil would continue throughout the

next five years.  Park said the protests have brought to

light two issues that the government needs to find a way to

deal with.  The first is the degree to which Koreans are

networked and sharing information over the internet.  The

second major challenge is to deal with the challenge the

protests pose to Korea’s democratic governance. Park said

Alliance issues would have to wait until things “settle down.” 
—————————-

“Land of the Morning Crisis”

—————————- 
¶2.  (C) GNP Representative Park Jin said Korea is

experiencing an “extraordinary” crisis.  In response to ASD

Shinn’s question about how the crisis came about, Park said

it would take a doctoral thesis to explain the reasons for

the recent protests over the impending resumption of U.S.

beef imports into Korea.  Park said part of the reason was

that President Lee went to the U.S. too soon after taking

office.  He should have waited until he settled in, but that

just was not possible.  Yonsei University Professor Lee

Jung-hoon, also at the dinner, said a lot of the public angst

was rooted in Lee’s personnel choices.  Park concurred and

said the impression was that President Lee was leading a

government of the wealthy dictating policy to the common

people. 
¶3.  (C) Lee said that the perception that U.S. beef is

dangerous seems to be dissipating.  The unions are moving on

to other issues.  Park noted that there were also increasing

calls to stop the “lawlessness” of the protests.  Park also

cautioned, however, that President Lee had to handle the

situation very carefully or it would plague him for the rest

of his term. 
——————–

“Too Much Democracy”

——————– 
¶4.  (C) Representative Park said that the protests presented

a very serious challenge to Korean democracy.  The democratic

movement, he explained, had progressed at breakneck speed and

now people thought that massive demonstrations was the proper

way to communicate with the government.  Park speculated that

Korea had “too much democracy.”  Mary Beth Morgan, Korea

Country Team Director, asked if Korean constituents felt as

natural bringing complaints to their representatives as do

Americans.  Park said that he got massive amounts of email

every day, but, when making policy decisions, he weighted his

constituents’ opinion about 30 percent and national opinion

at about 70 percent. 
——————

“Urban Guerrillas”

—————— 
¶5.  (C) Both men said that the degree to which Koreans are

networked and sharing information via the internet has fueled

the protests and left the government wondering how to

respond.  Cites like Agora Forum on Daum and Afreeca allow

users to post like webcasts and share information and, in the

case of U.S. beef, rumor.  Park called this trend

“technological urban guerrilla civil disobedience.”  In order

to address this issue, President Lee decided to reinstate an

office on technology set up former President Roh Moo-hyun,

but closed down by the Lee Administration for being too

liberal.  (Note: On June 19 the Blue House did, in fact,

announce that Kim Chul-kyun, a former vice president at Daum,

to assume a new position designed to monitor public opinion

on the internet.) 
———————————

Alliance Issues on the Backburner 
——————————— 
¶6.  (C) ASD Shinn tried several times to turn the

conversation toward Alliance issues, but Park seemed

understandably distracted and consumed by the domestic

political situation.  Park expressed regret that these

problems came at the beginning of a new relationship between

the U.S. and the ROK.  Professor Lee mentioned OPCON and said

that he hoped the two governments could reconsider the

transfer decision.  ASD Shinn replied that the transfer was

both a sign of confidence in and a huge opportunity for the

ROK military.  In order to meet the requirements of the

transfer, there was a long was a lot of procurement and

training that would ultimately make the military stronger.

Morgan pointed out that the roadmap was very much on track. 
¶7. (U) ASD Shinn has cleared this message.

VERSHBOW

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SEOUL 001204 

SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KS KN

SUBJECT: TURBULENT TIMES FOR PRESIDENT LEE: CAN HE RECOVER? 
REF: A. SEOUL 001145

     ¶B. SEOUL 001153

     ¶C. SEOUL 001174 
Classified By: AMB Alexander S. Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: President Lee Myung-bak is only four months

into his five-year term in office and already he has hit

historically low popularity ratings of around 10 percent.

Lee’s first 100 days have been a crash course in political

reality.  The public’s disappointment with the new

administration’s handling of state affairs and perception

that the Blue House disregards public opinion have virtually

crippled the administration, and the six weeks of candlelight

vigils have paralyzed decision-making, raising real concerns

about Korea’s governability in the years ahead.  Bitter

intra-party feuding and an opposition with nothing to lose

have all made it harder for President Lee to exert control.

Over the past month, the decision to restart imports of U.S.

beef has become the vehicle through which South Koreans are

expressing their anger.  President Lee cannot rebuild his

credibility until this storm passes, and we need to help Lee

defuse the beef issue without crossing our red lines.  We

should also help vindicate his original decision on beef by

making an all-out effort to get the KORUS FTA ratified by

Congress by year end. 
¶2.  (C) Even then, Lee will find it difficult to make

progress on his domestic agenda or on a host of potentially

controversial alliance issues, including the Special Measures

Agreement (SMA) negotiations, camp returns, USFK relocation,

and possibly FTA ratification by the National Assembly.

Efforts to promote robust ROK participation in international

efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the Proliferation

Security Initiative (PSI) are also likely to become much more

difficult for the foreseeable future.  Even if we weather

this storm, we may need to lower expectations for the “21st

Century Alliance,” since Lee will be a crippled leader for

some time to come.  END SUMMARY. 
————————

Problems Out of the Gate

———————— 
¶3.  (C) Lee used his CEO instincts to staff the cabinet and

the Blue House with the “best of the best” but instead he

brought in an elite team that was derided from the get-go for

their patrician credentials.  Even before taking office, Lee

was criticized for his cabinet choices, as many of his

nominees came from wealthy backgrounds — most were members

of Lee’s church, alumni of his alma mater Korea University,

and from his home province of Gyeongsang. According to a

mandatory disclosure report for government officials, members

of Lee’s cabinet were almost twice as wealthy as their

predecessors.  Progressive press began to sow doubts that Lee

genuinely had the average South Korean’s interests at heart,

especially when four of his appointees had to step down

during nomination hearings due to allegations of ethical

lapses and illegal real estate speculation.  Personnel

problems continued in May when Lee’s Blue House Chief of

Social Policy was forced to resign under charges of illegal

land speculation.  (NOTE: The current top staff members in

the Blue House have an average net worth of around 4 million

USD. END NOTE.) 
——————-

Conservatives Split

——————- 
¶4.  (C) Not only has President Lee failed to build public

consensus, but his failure to unite the conservatives

continues to dog his administration.  Although Lee won an

unprecedented margin of victory in the December presidential

election (48.7 percent of the vote to 26.3 percent for his

closest rival), he had only eked out his party’s nomination

in the presidential primary.  His rival, Park Geun-hye,

retains a great amount of support within the party as well as

enormous popular appeal in the country.  Instead of working

with Park to unite the Grand National Party (GNP), Lee and

his top aides worked to exclude politicians loyal to Park 
SEOUL 00001204  002 OF 005 
from gaining nominations in the April 9 National Assembly

election.  Lee was successful in excluding some Park

loyalists, but his direct involvement in the nomination

process and the bitter infighting caused many traditional

conservatives to turn away from Lee.  Continued infighting

with Park gave the impression that he was unwilling to work

with those who might oppose his ideas.  The GNP only obtained

a slim majority — 153 seats out of 299 — far short of

earlier predictions that projected the GNP winning as many as

200 seats; conservative candidates outside the GNP won an

additional 47 seats, demonstrating that conservative voters,

especially Park Geun-hye supporters, were fed up with the GNP

controlled by President Lee’s faction. 
—————-

Election Baggage

—————- 
¶5.  (C) Issues held over from the December presidential

election continue to spur public frustration.  Most notably,

Lee’s promises to supercharge the economy are increasingly

difficult to realize in a slowing global economy.  Lee was

elected on his pledge to grow the economy by seven percent,

but has been forced to dial down his promises because of

larger economic factors at play, such as rising world oil and

food prices and a slowing U.S. economy.  Prices for everyday

goods such as ramen noodles (a staple food for working

Koreans and students) have gone up; gasoline is about USD 10

per gallon, angering truckers, commuters and small business

owners; and growth projections are being lowered.  The

policies Lee has announced (such as efforts to monitor the

prices of 50 basic goods related to public welfare) have been

criticized as being insufficient, overly interventionist, and

purely political.  Additionally, Lee’s efforts to revise

regulations to boost investment by Korea’s chaebol businesses

have done little to assuage public concern that his policies

are targeted toward the elite and ignore the plight of the

middle and lower classes. 
¶6.  (C) Lee has yet to succeed in obtaining public buy-in for

any of his policy initiatives.  He has announced several new

policies without apparently first consulting experts or the

public, which has resulted in his ideas being derided and

called “half-baked” and “amateur.”  The best example of this

is Lee’s effort to reform Korea’s education system —

specifically his efforts to dramatically increase the number

of high school classes taught in English.  His failure to

consult with experts before making the announcement resulted

in glaring problems with the initiative, including a dearth

of qualified instructors.  Lee also failed to carry out his

campaign promise to set up physical and online sites as

forums for the public to communicate concerns to the

President.  He did manage to establish a hotline for top

executives to speak directly to the president, reinforcing

perceptions that Lee has only the elite’s interest at heart. 
¶7.  (C) Controversy surrounding Lee’s ambitious cross-country

Grand Canal project resurfaced at the end of May just as the

beef controversy was coming to a head.  Despite the fact that

67 percent of the public disapproved of the canal, shortly

after Lee’s inauguration the then minister-designate for Land

and Oceans sparked heated criticism by stating that he would

definitely undertake the project.  Lee later suggested that

he would postpone construction and his party even went so far

as to drop it from its platform ahead of the general

election.  In late March and again in early May, however,

revelations that the ROKG had no intention of abandoning the

canal project intensified public condemnation that the Lee

Administration refused to listen to the voice of the people. 
—————-

Mismanaging Beef

—————- 
¶8.  (C) If all these issues led to a sense of dissatisfaction

with Lee’s early performance, the decision to reopen the

market to U.S. beef, and the government’s mishandling of the

issue, proved to be a catalyst that galvanized Korean public

opinion.  In thinking about moving forward on beef during the

transition and early days of the new administration, Lee had 
SEOUL 00001204  003 OF 005 
several key goals:  to proceed with an agreement that was

largely in line with what the Roh Administration had quietly

discussed with us, to wait until after the April 9

legislative elections to publicly announce the negotiations;

and to prepare a set of support measures to help the Korean

beef industry (which was expected to be the principal source

of opposition) to adjust.  However, not enough was done to

prepare the Korean public for the move from the government’s

historic position (that many questions remained about the

safety of U.S. beef) — not by MOFAT, which saw its role as

negotiating the deal with the USG; not by the Agricultural

Ministry, which continued to hope to the end that the market

would remain closed; and not by the Blue House, which had

further tied its hands by dismantling much of the public and

media outreach operations it inherited from the Roh

Government, in the interest of cost-cutting.   To the Korean

public, the dramatic shift in the ROKG’s public posture on

U.S. beef, coming at the end of a tough week-long negotiation

and concluding the night before President Lee was to meet

with President Bush, seemed to demonstrate that the safety

concerns of the Korean public were being tossed aside so Lee

could enjoy an historic summit at Camp David. 
¶9.  (C) After the beef deal was announced and released for

public comment, public opposition quickly grew in a way that

reflected some uniquely Korean characteristics.

Misinformation about the safety of U.S. beef, much of it

peddled by activist groups with a broader political agenda,

was disseminated on cell phone text messages (which for many

Korean youths have more credibility than established media,

since they are “independent”).  Students played a dominant

role in the early protests, saying that eating U.S. beef

wasn’t a matter of consumer choice (as Lee had early-on

argued) since students would have no choice but to eat the

allegedly BSE-infected U.S. beef that Korean school

cafeterias (and military messes) would serve.  As concern

about U.S. beef spread from students to the mainstream

population, the government’s missteps exacerbated the

situation.  Agriculture Ministry officials, uncertain about

the text of the beef agreement during a parliamentary

hearing, suggested that their confusion stemmed from not

understanding the English language used during the

negotiation — both incorrect (the negotiations were

conducted with consecutive interpretation) and hardly a way

to build public confidence in the bilateral agreement that

ensued. 
¶10. (C) While the beef issue would probably have benefited

from some benign neglect — at least until Lee’s GNP allies

took control of the National Assembly on May 30 — the Lee

Government instead proceeded with its efforts to force FTA

ratification through the National Assembly in a May lame-duck

session, providing the opposition United Democratic Party

(UDP), in majority at the time, a spectacular platform to

grandstand against the beef deal and insist that it be

renegotiated.  Turning water cannons on the protestors

brought back unpleasant memories of past governments, and

enabled the protestors to present themselves as fighters for

Korean democracy. 
¶11.  (C) To its credit, the Lee Government has tried to do

the right thing on beef, and has resisted the calls for

renegotiation of the beef deal that have come in from

protestors, the political opposition, and the GNP alike.  Lee

and his top advisors continue to believe that once a

temporary solution is found, a line can be drawn under this

crisis, the Korean public can be educated about the safety of

U.S. beef, the market fully reopened, and the KORUS FTA teed

up for ratification.  However, the general disarray within

the government, the chaos in the streets, and the fact that

the protestors have made Lee himself the issue, have all made

it difficult for the government to defend its position and

challenge the allegations of the protestors.  Instead, the

government has found itself chasing after the moving

goalposts of NGO demands, trying to address each new

allegation as it arises.  It is clear the NGO groups in the

“BSE Beef Alliance” (many of whom are also opposed to the

KORUS FTA, and see killing the beef deal as one of their best

ways to sink the FTA in Washington, since it continues to

enjoy majority support in Korea) will not be content until 
SEOUL 00001204  004 OF 005 
Lee backs down and abrogates the beef deal (and/or formally

requests renegotiation).  The Lee Government’s good-faith

efforts to address their concerns have only emboldened these

groups.  It is equally clear that while we should try to help

Lee find a temporary solution to this problem — including

agreeing to temporary limitations on export of the most

sensitive beef products, without crossing any red lines — no

matter how the beef situation is resolved, it has

crystallized a critique of Lee’s governance that will weaken

him, and provide a rallying cry for his opponents, for some

time to come. 
——————

Lee is Floundering

—————— 
¶12.  (C) The recent outpouring of disapproval over the beef

issue has become the rallying cry enabling South Koreans to

express their cumulative frustration with the Lee

Administration.  The grassroots protests have focused mostly

on a sense that the government was willing to sacrifice the

health of the people in the interest of maintaining strong

ties to the U.S.  Protest organizers, mostly progressive

civic groups, organized labor and farm groups, have made

misleading and outright false charges against American beef,

aided by several outrageously slanted documentaries on state

TV networks still dominated by leftist management.  Sadly,

many Koreans find these charges credible, because the

credibility of the Lee Administration is so low.  Educated

Koreans do know better and reject these allegations as being

unscientific.  Still, they are of the view that Lee made a

serious mistake in rushing to open the beef market.  What

makes the situation much more inflammable is that this was

American beef and the agreement was reached hours before the

Camp David summit.  The perception that President Lee was

kowtowing to Washington is a theme much used by leftists and

nationalists in the protest, but anti-Americanism is not the

principal draw for the mainstream protesters; rather, it’s

anti-Lee. 
¶13.  (C) The opposition United Democratic Party (UDP),

struggling to find a mode of popular appeal after resounding

defeats in both the presidential and the National Assembly

elections, has seized on the beef issue in hopes of boosting

its own support base.  The UDP has demanded that the ROKG

renegotiate the beef issue before the party will end its

ongoing boycott of the 18th National Assembly.  The

opposition has used the beef issue to thrust its members back

into the limelight, criticizing (and misquoting) both the Lee

Administration and the U.S. Government.  They have, however,

notably not joined in the protesters’ demands that Lee be

removed from office and have not even floated the idea of

impeachment proceedings.  Interestingly, all its bluster has

gotten it nowhere; UDP support ratings still hover around 20

percent. 
¶14.  (C) Perhaps even more disturbingly, the ongoing protests

do call into question Koreans’ respect for the rule of law

and their own constitution.  Many Koreans view these protests

as a shining exemplar of democracy, rather than as the rule

of the masses that more informed observers are voicing

concerns about.  The ability of several thousand protesters

– many of them too young to vote — to bring Korea’s

government to a standstill threatens Korean credibility in

negotiating other international agreements.  More serious

still are the long term implications for the governability of

Korea.  Koreans — both on the right and the left — are

beginning to express serious concern that the beef hysteria

is dangerously empowering the “mob.”  Unless the ROKG manages

to win some control back, many of our interlocutors see a

grim picture of protests becoming the norm in deciding the

nation’s policy. 
—————-

Alliance on Hold?

—————- 
¶15.  (C) The beef issue will have profound influence on our

bilateral relationship in the coming months.  First, Lee

Myung-bak must rebuild domestic trust in his administration 
SEOUL 00001204  005 OF 005 
before he or his staff can even think about making any

progress on ongoing bilateral issues.  To rush into any

controversial Alliance agreements, our ROKG interlocutors

believe, is to open the door on the nascent anti-Americanism

that the protests have thus far assiduously avoided.  Already

the ROKG has taken care to push all ongoing Alliance issues

to the back burner.  In the last two weeks, the ROK side has

postponed some of our bilateral talks — the

regularly-scheduled Strategic Consultations for Allied

Partnership (SCAP), the next round of SMA negotiations, and

talks on the environmental issues relating to the return of

nine USFK camps.  SMA and camp returns have long been two of

the most sensitive Alliance issues for the Koreans, as they

require committing ROK budgetary expenditures and have

generated significant criticism for “not standing up to the

U.S.” on previous occasions.  Other issues that the Korean

public sees as being on the U.S. “wish list” — such as

continued or expanded ROK participation in Iraq and

Afghanistan as well as involvement in the Proliferation

Security Initiative (PSI) — will also prove more difficult

to make progress on in the short to medium term. 
——-

Comment

——- 
¶16.  (C) This is a nightmare for Lee Myung-bak.  Simply put,

he does not know what to do right now.  He knows that to give

in to the protests is to cripple his administration for the

remaining 56 months.  Yet, ignoring their demands will only

prolong the agony and make him look even weaker.  The course

he has chosen is a little bit of both:  bow to the crowd by

apologizing and revising some elements of the beef deal, but

not go all the way to a renegotiation of the agreement that

would likely kill chances for ratification of the FTA in the

U.S.  In addition, he will reshuffle the cabinet and his

senior staff.  Thereafter, Lee must begin the long process of

regaining his own credibility.  Key to this scenario is

getting significant help from the National Assembly, which is

possible only if President Lee accepts the reality that he

must share power with his fellow conservatives, principally

Park Geun-hye. 
¶17.  (C) At this time President Lee needs our help to come

out of the immediate crisis.  Our first task must be to stop

his political free-fall by agreeing on a beef package that he

can sell to his mainstream domestic critics — satisfying the

extremists is not possible, unless Lee resigns.  At the same

time, we should be prepared to defer our sensitive bilateral

issues, such as SMA and camp returns, until the situation has

stabilized.  Beyond the immediate terms, we must also support

and vindicate Lee’s original — and courageous — decision on

beef by making a concerted effort to push for KORUS FTA

ratification in the Congress.  Our failure to ratify the

KORUS FTA will most definitely further weaken the Lee

presidency.  In the longer term, the damage Lee has suffered

from the beef hysteria is such that we might need to reassess

our expectations for the “21st Century Strategic Alliance”

launched at Camp David because, if the Lee Administration

continues on its current course, we will be dealing with a

crippled ally for a long time to come.

VERSHBOW

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001153 

SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KS KN

SUBJECT: PROTESTS CONTINUE AS BLUE HOUSE STRUGGLES TO FIND

SOLUTION 
REF: SEOUL 01145 
Classified By: POL Joseph Y. Yun.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Throughout the June 6-8 holiday weekend,

protesters continued to call for a renegotiation of the

agreement to reopen the Korean market to U.S. beef, a ban on

imports of beef from cattle over 30-months-old, and President

Lee Myung-bak’s removal from office.  The protests, which

occasionally turned violent, seemed to avoid the

anti-American overtones that were percolating just last week.

 That said, police had to use force to prevent aggressive

crowds from marching on to the Blue House.  Some — notably

former President Roh Moo-hyun — have started to speak out

against the protests, which show no signs of abating in the

near future (police contacts note 9,000 are expected June 9

and several hundred thousand on June 10).  The Blue House is

preparing to replace a number of cabinet ministers and senior

secretaries in an attempt to placate the public.  Meanwhile,

former Lee Myung-bak confidant Chung Doo-un publicly accused

Blue House insiders of intentionally keeping the president in

the dark on the beef issue.  End Summary. 
——————————————— —

Protests: Carnival by Day, Mean Streets by Night

——————————————— — 
¶2.  (SBU) In the evening on June 5, protesters, taking

advantage of the holiday on Friday, began a 72-hour protest

calling for a renegotiation of the U.S.-ROK agreement that

lifts the ban on imports of U.S. beef.  The protests were

approximately the same size as previous protests — police

estimate around 40,000.  By day, the demonstrations took on

the air of a festival: families attended, music groups

performed, and the women selling dried squid snacks made out

like bandits.  When the families went home, however, the

violence started.  About 8,800 protesters and thousands of

police confronted each other at the Gwanghwamun intersection,

which lies between the City Hall rallying point and the U.S.

Embassy (and is also the main route to the Blue House).

Protesters sprayed fire extinguishers and threw debris at

police who responded with water canons.  About 10 people

suffered facial and head injuries in the clashes and 11

people were arrested for violence. 
¶3.  (SBU) Criticisms of the protesters has increased in the

wake of the weekend’s violent outbursts.  Newspaper

editorials have urged protesters to refrain from violent

acts.  The ROKG, of course, asked that the people “express

their wishes in a legal and mature manner.”  Most notably,

former President Roh Moo-hyun has spoken out against the

protests.  Roh cautioned that even if the beef deal was

wrong, it was unconstitutional and undemocratic to demand

President Lee Myung-bak’s removal from office, which has

become a rallying cry.  There have also been small, isolated

“anti-candlelight” protests.  What started out as one man in

front of the Seoul Finance Center swelled to 10 protesters

calling for an end to the vigils.  These “anti-candlelight”

protesters were not well-received by their compatriots.

Despite these efforts, protests are scheduled to continue

this week and will probably be particularly well attended on

June 10 and June 13 (reftel). 
—————–

Impending Shuffle

—————– 
¶4.  (SBU) The Blue House is poised to reshuffle the cabinet

and replace some senior secretaries in an attempt to appease

the angry populace.  Pundits expect Prime Minister Han

Seung-soo and all of the cabinet ministers to tender their

resignations as well to take responsibility for beef

agreement.  Press reports site Blue House sources who say

that President Lee is expected to selectively accept the

offers and replace half a dozen ministers involved in the

beef deal, possibly including Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan,

Agricultural Minister Chung Woon-chun, and Finance Minister

Kang Man-soo. 
¶5.  (SBU) On Friday, senior secretaries to President Lee,

including Chief of Staff Yu Woo-ik and Spokesman Lee

Dong-kwan, offered to resign en masse, holding themselves 
responsible for the escalating dispute over the beef deal.

Lee is expected to replace Yu and several senior secretaries,

including Kim Byong-kook, senior presidential secretary in

charge of foreign policy. 
———————————

You Bite My Back, I’ll Bite Yours

——————————— 
¶6.  (SBU) On June 7 former Lee Myung-bak confidant Chung

Doo-un told the Chosun Newspaper that President Lee Myung-bak

has been kept in the dark by his aides, which is why he has

had such a weak grasp of the public backlash over the beef

deal.  Chung accused three presidential aides and one

lawmaker of deceiving the president and abusing their

authority.  The most powerful of the four, Chung alleged, was

Park Young-joon, the president’s planning and coordination

secretary.  Park called Chung’s claims “groundless” and

accused him of “character assassination.”  Press reports

speculate that the unnamed lawmaker Chung referred to was Lee

Sang-deuk, Lee Myung-bak’s older brother. 
¶7.  (C) Chung’s allegations come at a politically sensitive

time; President Lee’s approval ratings are at 17 percent.  On

June 8, senior lawmaker Kim Moo-sung told poloff that Chung

made the statement because he is bitter.  He was a close Lee

advisor throughout the campaign and feels that he has been

sidelined by the very people he is now accusing.  The Blue

House is furious because it makes the staff look bad and Lee

Myung-bak look incompetent.  Kim also told poloff that he had

advised Park Geun-hye not to take the Prime Minister position

if offered again because she has nothing to gain.  (NOTE:

Some speculate that Lee will accept Han Seung-soo’s

resignation and ask Park Geun-hye to take his place. END

NOTE)  Kim said he had previously advised her to stay quiet

on the beef issue — she disregarded this advice when she

demanded renegotiation a few weeks ago.  Since then, however,

she has been silent on the matter. 
——-

COMMENT

——- 
¶8.  (C) When Lee Myung-bak’s only public defender is former

President and political pariah Roh Moo-hyun, one has to

wonder if Lee can slip any lower.  Time will tell.  For now,

a house cleaning might help defuse the beef controversy, but

questions about Lee’s leadership remain.  He may still be

able to make progress on policy issues, especially with the

help of a conservative-dominated assembly; even Roh Moo-hyun

at the height of his unpopularity managed to push through

some important initiatives.  The strength of the executive

branch and the conservative leaning of a majority of Koreans

should allow Lee, in time, to recover some of his lost

popularity.  For now, Lee Myung-bak is a crippled president.

VERSHBOW

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001145 

SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KS KN

SUBJECT: GNP LEADERSHIP REACHES OUT TO U.S. ON BEEF 
Classified By: AMB Alexander S. Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  On June 6 the Ambassador met with leaders

of the ruling Grand National Party (GNP) to discuss ongoing

public outcry over the U.S.-ROK agreement to lift the Korean

ban on U.S. beef imports.  GNP chairman Kang Jae-sup, who

requested the meeting earlier in the week, said the party was

concerned about the possible ramifications the protests could

have for President Lee Myung-bak’s efforts to restore the

bilateral relationship.  Kang said he understood that

changing the agreement was difficult but that something needs

to be done to address the public’s and the opposition party’s

“obsession” with renegotiation.  The Ambassador assured the

GNP leaders that the U.S. understood the sensitivity of the

issue; while the beef agreement was a sound scientific

agreement that did not need to be renegotiated, the U.S.

understood that Korean consumer concerns were real and was

working to address them without renegotiating.  We hoped the

GNP (and ideally the opposition United Democratic Party)

would emphasize that what matters is an outcome that

addresses people’s concerns about over-30-month beef rather

than the method used to get there.  Kang raised the

possibility of sending a bipartisan National Assembly

delegation to Washington but said the United Democratic Party

(UDP) has not yet signed on; UDP chairman Sohn Hak-kyu, Kang

said, is no longer taking his calls.  End Summary. 
—————–

Comments to Media

—————– 
¶2.  (U) At the start of the meeting, GNP Chairman Kang

delivered an opening statement in front of about 60

reporters.  He noted that beef was a sensitive item in Korean

culture, and reflects sentiment that cannot be explained by

science alone.  The two governments had been making faithful

efforts to resolve the issue.  Kang urged the Ambassador to

fully report on the situation to Washington and help make

every effort to smoothly resolve the situation.  The

Ambassador thanked Kang for inviting him to meet, said he was

sensitive to the Korean public’s concern, and appreciated the

cultural heritage of Korea and place of beef in it.  He

explained that he had been working hard with Washington to

try to find a solution that can address public concerns.  (At

this point the press departed).  (NOTE:  Substance of press

opportunity was coordinated with Kang’s staff beforehand. End

note.) 
———————————

Protests Possible Throughout June

——————————— 
¶3.  (C) In the private meeting, Kang Jae-sup pointed out

that, since the first candlelight vigil was held in early

May, there have been 27 such vigils with up to 60,000

participants. (Note: Estimates of participation in the

protests vary.  Organizers claim 100,000 showed up to last

weekend’s protests, while the police claim the number was

closer to 40,000. End note.)  More rallies will be held over

the three-day holiday weekend with an even bigger rally on

June 10, the anniversary of the beginning of the 1987

pro-Democracy protests.  The problem, Kang said, is that

these protests have taken on a symbolic meaning, with

candlelight vigils having a symbolic meaning in U.S.-Korean

relations. 
¶4.  (C) Kang pointed out that the month of June is full of

anniversaries that could cause ongoing problems.  In addition

to the June 10 anniversary, June 13 is the anniversary of the

day when two middle school girls were struck and killed by a

vehicle operated by U.S. servicemen in 2002, and June 15 is

the anniversary of the first inter-Korean summit in 2000.

The month culminates with President Bush’s planned visit to

Korea, making it likely that protests will continue. 
————————–

Impact on Bilateral Issues

————————– 
¶5.  (C) Kang said the source of these protests is complex.

He did not believe the U.S. government was responsible for

the current situation, but he worried that the continuation

of the protests could carry over to other bilateral issues.

Representative Im Tae-hee, also in attendance, underscored

this concern.  Im said that U.S.-ROK relations had only

recently been restored and we should work hard to keep

relations on track.  The Ambassador agreed that the two

governments should work together to resolve the issue as

quickly as possible.  He was dismayed to see Korean

housewives holding up placards asking the U.S. not to “force

Koreans to eat mad cows,” as if an ally of 60 years would

intentionally cause harm.  It was important to resolve this,

because more than beef was at stake — we needed to move

forward in an effort to get the KORUS FTA ratified this year,

and continue building our partnership. 
¶6.  (C) Kang said he understood that private sector importers

and exporters were making efforts to address public concerns

about over-30-month beef, but he said it was the party’s hope

that the two governments could find some way to guarantee

that, either through re-negotiation or additional

negotiations (he noted the specific terms were not as

important as a government role).  The ROKG understood the

difficulty of renegotiating, but the ruling party had to find

a way to address the UDP’s and the public’s “obsession” about

renegotiating the agreement, Kang explained. 
¶7.  (C) The Ambassador replied that the existing agreement is

a good one, and in our view doesn’t require renegotiation

since it is based on science, which should be the basis of

trade between our two countries (in addition, renegotiation

would also hurt U.S. negotiations with other countries — the

same countries Korea is asking us to reach OIE-consistent

beef agreements with).  The U.S. understood, however, that

the consumer concerns right now are real, and was working to

find a way to address them.  The Ambassador expressed his

hope that the GNP leadership would be able to convince the

Korean public that getting the right outcome was more

important than the means.  Kang said that with the focus on

“renegotiation,” some kind of government role in guaranteeing

any private sector arrangement would help resolve the

political situation. 
¶8.  (C) Im said the key was to resolve public concern about

beef from cattle over 30 months of age.  Kang said that he

understood that the private sector is trying to voluntarily

restrict beef imports from cattle over 30 months of age.  He

expressed his hope that importers and exporters would take

into consideration the wishes of consumers.  Ambassador

explained that we are trying to find a way to address those

concerns, and, while requesting that it not be made public,

said there was ongoing discussion of some steps that could be

taken to address Korean concerns about beef over 30 months

old. 
—————–

Opposition Antics

—————– 
¶9.  (C) Kang said the ROKG hopes to send a bipartisan

National Assembly delegation to Washington early next week to

discuss beef and the KORUS FTA.  The UDP, however, has not

yet agreed to participate.  Kang said he had met with UDP

leader Sohn Hak-kyu shortly after the vigils began.  Kang

offered to cancel a lawsuit currently pending against the UDP

if the opposition would cooperate on the beef issue.  Kang

said the UDP refused the offer and that Sohn will no longer

take Kang’s calls.  The UDP seemed determined to drive a

wedge between Korea and the United States.  The Ambassador

said he was distressed by the opposition party’s attitude.

Noting that his comments should be kept private, he commented

that the UDP should think about Korea’s reputation in the

world as a government based on the rule of law rather than on

protests and propaganda. 
——-

Comment

——- 
¶10.  (C) GNP staff coordinated with us before the meeting,

and said the GNP’s goals were: (1) to show that the GNP was

trying to appear proactive to a disenchanted public; and (2)

to obtain direct confirmation that the U.S. is not prepared

to renegotiate the beef agreement (which they understood

based on ROG briefings is a non-starter).  In that respect,

this meeting stuck to the script, and Kang showed a readiness

to avoid inflaming the situation by not asking particularly

pointed questions about beef in front of the cameras (or at

all).  Hopefully, this will help enable the GNP to build

support for whatever solution is reached (which will clearly

not meet the demands of the street activists).  While the GNP

has a majority in the new National Assembly session and won’t

need UDP support to pass legislation, in the past week the

GNP has been trying to be responsive to UDP concerns to win

their cooperation on organization of the new National

Assembly session.  That effort appears to have been

unsuccessful. 
VERSHBOW

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UNCLAS SEOUL 001144 

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KS KN

SUBJECT: GNP DEFEAT IN BY-ELECTIONS REFLECTS PUBLIC ANGST 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The ruling Grand National Party’s (GNP)

poor showing in the June 4 by-election — on the same day as

President Lee Myung-bak’s 100th day in office – is largely a

reflection of public dissatisfaction with the new

administration.  The GNP party won only nine of the 52 local

seats up for grabs, and local press are contrasting the GNP’s

failure to win a single seat in Seoul with their landslide

victories in the capital region in the April 9 general

election.  End Summary. 
—————————–

What Was At Stake and Who Won

—————————– 
¶2.  (SBU) The final voting results, which came out on June 5,

reflected ongoing political backlash over U.S. beef imports.

Out of the total 52 seats (9 county/district chief posts, 29

provincial and municipal council seats, 14 township council

seats) up for grabs in the June 4 by-election, the GNP won

only nine; the main opposition United Democratic Party (UDP)

secured 23.  This is a big set back for the ruling party,

which had won every local election since the 2004

parliamentary elections. 
—————–

Low Voter Turnout

—————– 
¶3.  (SBU) Voter turnout for the by-elections was 23.2

percent, the second lowest in local election history, despite

the National Election Commission (NEC) extending voting hours

until 8 pm from the usual 6 pm.  According to an NEC

official, the low turnout had been expected to a certain

extent because the by-elections came shortly after the

presidential and parliamentary elections.  Bad weather also

contributed to the low turnout. 
——————————————

Post-Local Election Politics Focus on Beef

—————————————— 
¶4.  (SBU) UDP leader Sohn Hak-kyu called the results a

“warning” to the Lee Myung-bak administration and emphasized

his party’s consolidated drive to push for renegotiations of

the U.S.-ROK beef deal.  The GNP, in a statement issued by

spokesperson Cho Yoon-sun, also acknowledged that, “there was

insufficient communication between the GNP and citizens,” and

that “we humbly accept the public sentiment reflected in the

by-elections.”  Widespread perceptions among all parties that

the elections reflected public dissatisfaction with President

Lee Myung-bak’s handling of state affairs — especially the

U.S. beef deal — makes it likely that the GNP will increase

its pressure on the Blue House to expand the scope of the

Cabinet reshuffle plan expected in the near future. 
——-

Comment

——- 
¶5.  (SBU) The Lee Myung-bak Administration is in trouble, and

it is unclear if anyone on his team can fashion a political

bailout before it is too late.  After the results were

announced, Lee reportedly told his staff to prepare

countermeasures.  Nobody believes there is a magic bullet

because a series of apologies, proposals and policy ideas

have all fallen flat.

VERSHBOW

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001122 

SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION

TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD EAGR KS

SUBJECT: PROTESTS IN SEOUL BECOME MORE FLUID 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4(b/d) 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Protestors turned out in force over the

weekend following the announcement by the Agriculture

Minister on the evening of May 29 that Korea would shortly

resume quarantine inspections on U.S. beef as a first step to

reopening the market.  Although there had been a string of

candlelight vigils in Seoul beginning in early May, after the

beef agreement was reached in April on the eve of President

Lee’s visit to Camp David, the vigils have shifted to active

protests, fueled by police crackdowns and arrests of

“illegal” protestors.  As the focus of the protests expanded

beyond concerns about U.S. beef to include general resentment

for President Lee and his perceived method of “bulldozing”

policies into action, the public responded with calls for the

President’s impeachment and demanded the resignation of

several cabinet ministers.  Images and video captured at the

scene of confrontation between police and protestors were

quickly posted on the Internet, thereby adding more fuel to

the fire of growing discontent among Koreans.  Groups of

varying size are likely to continue to organize in the coming

days despite the fact that President Lee is expected any day

to fire several ministers at the core of the policies in

question.  Meanwhile, the President’s support continues to

erode as his poll numbers are down to 21 percent.  End

Summary. 
——————————————— —-

PROTESTORS FACE WATER CANNONS AS TENSIONS ELEVATE

——————————————— —- 
¶2. (SBU) After almost four weeks of candlelight vigils to

protest the reopening of Korea to U.S. beef imports, the once

peaceful protests have taken a turn toward violence and

aggression.  On May 24, police began arresting protestors

after the government declared the protests “illegal.”  As

reports of the arrests spread via mobile phone text messages

and were splashed across Korean web sites, public resentment

of President Lee and his “bulldozer” style flared up.  On the

evening of May 31, the Korea National Police (KNP) estimated

that 40,000 protestors (organizers claimed up to 100,000

participated) rallied at Seoul Plaza to protest not just the

reopening of the Korean market to American beef, but

President Lee and his perceived lack of concern for public

opinion. 
¶3. (SBU) The large group of protestors represented a

cross-section of Korean society including college students,

middle-aged office workers, and even young families with

children in tow.  As the night wore on, several groups of

protestors broke off from the rally at Seoul Plaza and made

their way toward the Blue House, located about four blocks

away.  The KNP’s force of young riot police repelled the

groups of protestors using their batons and shields.

Additionally, police used water cannons to turn away the

crowds for the first time since the beef protests began in

early May.  (Note: The media reported that this was the 24th

vigil since the beef deal was concluded on April 18.  End

Note).  The police were effective in preventing the crowds

from getting too close to the Blue House, but the public was

further outraged at the reported injuries resulting from the

more aggressive police tactics.  Reports indicate that about

100 demonstrators and 40 riot police were injured during the

clashes.  In total, 516 people were arrested (15 were

released, 25 received a preliminary judgment, 399 were booked

without physical detention and 77 people are under

investigation) over the weekend the majority during Saturday

night’s rally. 
———————

ANTI-U.S. OR ANTI-MB?

——————— 
¶4. (SBU) The string of rallies against the importation of

U.S. beef appear to have morphed into a broader rally against

the new ROKG Administration and its way of doing business.

Although beef safety is still the main thrust of concern,

additional issues have surfaced as Koreans demonstrate their

pent-up emotion and general lack of satisfaction with the

direction of the new government.  Protestors carried a

variety of signs during the protest on Saturday, including

signs with references to the Proliferation Security

Initiative (PSI), the Grand Canal project, education reform,

privatization of electric companies, and the gap between rich

and poor.  There were larger numbers of

professionally-printed signs that simply said “Lee Myung-bak

OUT,” with similar signs portraying the President as a rat

and calling for his impeachment.  Others portrayed a shift

from mad cow disease to other issues such as “Mad Cow, Mad

Education” or “Cows are Mad. MB is Mad.”  There was also a

large group of protestors who donned flame-shaped hats (Note:

The flame is a symbol of anger in Korea) that said “I am

angry because of MB.”  These hats were provided by the

progressive NGO People’s Solidarity for Participatory

Democracy (PSPD), a group that was active in protesting OPCON

transfer, KORUS FTA, relocation of USFK to Pyeongtaek, and

other key U.S. initiatives in Korea. 
¶5. (SBU) Online blogs and news sites follow a similar tack.

An article posted on OhMy News said that “Koreans are not

portraying the United States as the culprit of the dispute.

Instead, all fingers are pointing at one man: President Lee.”

 A related article posted on one of Korea’s largest Internet

portal sites under the title “It is no longer just about

beef” said that Koreans are protesting President Lee’s

efforts to turn Korea into a “hyper-capitalist state” in a

short period of time, citing the Grand Canal project and the

privatization of key infrastructure as some of the areas of

concern. 
————

LATEST POLLS

———— 
¶6. (U) In a Gallup poll released on June 3 (100 days into

Lee’s presidency), results showed that 68.9 percent

disapproved of the President with 3.8 percent saying his

performance was average and only 21.2 percent approved of his

performance.  On the brighter side, 51 percent said they

expect the President Lee to do better in the future.  21.3

percent of respondents identified the root of their

discontent as President Lee’s lack of attention to public

opinion and 16.2 percent cited rising prices.  The survey was

conducted on May 31 before the latest round of violent

protests. 
——-

COMMENT

——- 
¶7. (C) Despite earlier hopes that the vigils and

demonstrations would subside with the conclusion of the 17th

National Assembly on May 24, an aggressive crackdown on the

protestors has only stirred more anger among Koreans.  While

it appears that beef is no longer the only reason for the

vigils and protests, it remains the central example of

President Lee’s perceived lack of attention to his

constituents and therefore the Korean public will continue to

demand action to resolve the beef issue.  Even if President

Lee moves forward with his expected cabinet shuffle, protests

against U.S. beef are likely to continue until Koreans feel

that their President hears their concerns and addresses their

demand not to import beef from cattle aged more than 30

months.

VERSHBOW

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001087 

SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KN KS

SUBJECT: LEE SANG-DEUK ON BEEF, PRESIDENT LEE’S MISSTEPS 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: Over a lunch of U.S. beef, the Ambassador

and Vice Speaker Lee, who is President Lee Myung-bak’s elder

brother, discussed solutions to the continuing controversy

over the planned reopening of the Korean market to U.S. beef.

 Vice Speaker Lee and recently reelected lawmaker Chun Yu-ok

were pessimistic the controversy would subside soon, but

optimistic that U.S. beef would soon reenter the market.  Lee

suggested it might be politically better for the Lee

government to delay the official opening until after the June

4 by-elections.  If not, a sweeping defeat for GNP candidates

could damage future ROKG initiatives.  Because progressive,

anti-American, and pro-DPRK leaders had directed the ROKG and

the Korean media for the last ten years, it was difficult now

for President Lee to overcome media bias and well-organized

leftist groups to resolve the beef issue.  He thought,

however, the situation would be easier once the

GNP-controlled National Assembly started its session in June.

 Both the Vice Speaker and pro-MB lawmaker Chun Yu-ok

acknowledged that President Lee had made some mistakes that

had contributed to people’s dissatisfaction with his

Administration.  Most of the President’s missteps they

attributed to President Lee’s lack of “political instinct.”

They both also expressed disappointment in Park Geun-hye and

other conservative leaders for not supporting President Lee

on beef and other issues.  Lee emphasized that U.S. support

was key to helping the ROKG overcome the beef problem.  Vice

Speaker Lee said that President Lee was pro-U.S. and

pro-Japan to the core so there should be no questioning

President Lee’s vision.  Ultimately, President Lee would do

right by the alliance and work well with both the U.S. and

Japan.  Lee said that the main task in the new National

Assembly would be to pass the KORUS FTA.  END SUMMARY 
—————-

BEEF CONTROVERSY

—————- 
¶2.  (C) During a pleasant lunch with President Lee’s elder

brother Lee Sang-deuk, the Ambassador asked if there was some

way to diffuse the controversy surrounding the reopening of

the Korean market to U.S. beef.  Vice Speaker Lee explained

that the “386 generation” focused on anti-American, pro-DPRK,

pro-Unification policies while younger Koreans are now

protesting against U.S. beef with a different motive.

Despite the different motive, the ideology of the 386-ers had

influenced the young people protesting the reopening of the

Korean market to U.S. beef imports.  While ten years ago some

felt that the U.S. was more of an enemy than North Korea, now

young people are worried about finding a job.  While some

worry that anti-beef sentiment could spiral into anti-U.S.

sentiment, Lee thought that once U.S. beef was available in

Korean stores, anti-beef protests would subside.  Eventually,

as holdovers from the anti-American/pro-DPRK period

(1998-2008 Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung presidencies) were

pushed out of positions of power and influence, such issues

would cease to be big problems. 
¶3.  (C) Lee said he was concerned that if the beef agreement

were finalized to allow imports of U.S. beef to begin

entering Korea before the June 4 by-election, it could become

the main election issue and cause GNP candidates to lose.

This would deal a heavy blow to President Lee.  Therefore,

waiting until after the election to finalize the agreement

would be helpful.  The Ambassador said waiting until after

the election would damage Korea’s credibility in the U.S.

Congress since there had already been delays.  Lee replied

that if there were trust between the governments, one more

small delay due to real political concerns should not make

much difference.  Rep. Chun disagreed with Lee and said she

thought it would be better to keep the current date and start

beef imports.  Lee conceded that he originally wanted the

beef market to reopen as quickly as possible so people could

eat U.S. beef but had changed his mind recently because of

the potential loss in the by-election. 
—————————

CONSERVATIVES BACK IN POWER

————————— 
¶4.  (C) Lee said the conservatives won the December

presidential and April National Assembly elections

convincingly, but some conservatives were disappointed by

President Lee’s focus on pragmatism at the expense of

traditional conservative principles.  Due to disappointment

with Lee, many of the pro-U.S. conservatives, such as Park

Geun-hye and her supporters, were not interested in helping

Lee handle his latest crisis.  Representative Chun added that

conservatives should thank President Lee for succeeding in

changing the government.  She admitted, however, that Lee

Myung-bak’s over-emphasis on pragmatism was a mistake, and

the disappointment of some conservatives was regrettable but

understandable. 
———————

INTRA-PARTY STRUGGLES

——————— 
¶5.  (C) Because the April 9 National Assembly elections were

just 45 days after Lee Myung-bak’s February 25 inauguration,

the public intra-party struggle was inevitable, Lee lamented.

 Compounding the issue, some Lee Myung-bak supporters had

tried to monopolize power by dominating the nomination

process.  Lee said he had put a brake on this movement, which

led certain GNP lawmakers to sign a petition against his

nomination.  These people have since apologized, Lee said.

Chun said some were opposed to Lee Sang-deuk remaining in the

National Assembly, but because Lee has an important role to

play, she had defended the choice to nominate Lee. 
¶6.  (C) Lee said that he was meeting traditional conservative

leaders on behalf of President Lee to try to smooth over

differences and convince them to support the President.  Both

Chun and Lee were not optimistic, however, that the pro-Park

lawmakers could assimilate well into the GNP and support

President Lee, even if their party membership were

reinstated.  Chun said that the likely scenario would result

in President Lee fighting not only the opposition party but

also the pro-Park lawmakers within the GNP.  Chun said the

reason she was pessimistic was that the pro-Park lawmakers

had been critical of the ROKG regarding the beef agreement. 
——————————–

FANNING THE FLAMES OF DISCONTENT

——————————– 
¶7.  (C) Before President Lee settled into office and “found

his place,” there was a struggle over nominations and

controversy surrounding beef, Lee said.  Compounding these

problems, Lee appointed a group of rich, U.S.-educated Blue

House senior secretaries and did not understand why Korean

people would rally against such appointments.  President Lee

kicked off his term without assessing the situation and

making concessions as needed.  The reason for this, Lee said,

was that President Lee has “poor political instinct” since he

had not been directly involved in Korean politics for very

long.  Worse still, many of President Lee’s close aides had

also never run for the National Assembly.  Therefore, neither

President Lee nor his aides were able to imagine the problems

that arose. 
————————————-

ROK: PRO-U.S., PRO-JAPAN, NOT PRO-PRC

————————————- 
¶8.  (C) Lee said that the lack of outrage over the Chinese

students who attacked some Koreans should not be a worry to

the U.S. since Lee Myung-bak was not pro-PRC.  There is a

broad base built up over the decades fighting the

dictatorships in Korea and supporting pro-DPRK policies, Lee

said.  USG leaders should realize that it will take time for

conservatives to unite and overcome this entrenched

organization. 
¶9.  (C) Chun pointed out that the ROK was closer to the U.S.

than to China due to recent history and this explained why

Koreans reacted more vehemently to the beef controversy than

to the violence by Chinese students.  Chun pointed out that

conflicts between close friends or family members can be the

most severe.  Also, the fact that Japan belonged to the visa

waiver program and the ROK did not contributed to sensitivity

on all issues American.  Chun said her daughter recently

returned from study in the U.S. and wondered why there was a

debate over U.S. beef.  More Koreans needed to have the

chance to go to the U.S. to dispel myths about the U.S. and

about U.S. beef, Chun concluded. 
¶10.  (C) The Ambassador said that President Lee was

respected, more in the U.S. than he was on April 18, when the

beef agreement was signed, because people now see how

difficult his decision was in light of the resultant domestic

opposition.  The Ambassador assured Lee that the USG

appreciated President Lee’s firm support of the U.S. and that

the highest levels of the USG, especially President Bush,

were sensitive to the political situation in Korea and would

not press for controversial decisions while the situation

remained difficult.  President Bush said during the summit

that no issue was a litmus test for the U.S.-ROK relationship

since the USG understood there were domestic concerns

influencing the handling of sensitive issues. 
¶11.  (C) Representative Lee said that President Lee Myung-bak

is pro-U.S. but there are still some pro-DPRK elements in the

press and in business.  Therefore, the U.S. needs to help

President Lee until these elements are replaced naturally

over time.  Some doubted President Lee, but Lee said he knew

Lee’s fundamental views were pro-U.S. and pro-Japan. 
——-

COMMENT

——- 
¶13.  (C) Vice Speaker Lee is considered the most influential

lawmaker in the National Assembly due to his relationship

with President Lee and his status as the most senior

conservative legislator.  The frustration with and criticism

of his brother, however, reflected an underlying tension

between the two.  National Assembly sources note that

President Lee asked his elder brother not to run for National

Assembly and was hurt when Lee ignored his advice and ran for

a sixth term.  This could have contributed to President Lee

ignoring the more politically astute Vice Speaker’s views on

matters of personnel and politics.  A long-time proponent of

compromise, Lee has the authority and know-how to help his

brother address complaints about how he is running the

country.  The big question is whether President Lee will

accept the help.

VERSHBOW

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001058 

SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION

TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN

SUBJECT: FORMER FM SONG: PHASED APPROACH FOR BEEF IS THE

BEST SOLUTION 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4(b/d) 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a May 22 luncheon meeting with the

Ambassador, National Assembly member-elect (and former

Foreign Minister) Song Min-soon said that it was up to the

U.S. to find a way out of the current beef situation and

recommended a phased opening of the beef market (as the Roh

administration had proposed late last year) as the only way

to assuage the liberal United Democratic Party’s (UDP)

concerns.  Song said that Koreans were caught off guard at

the abrupt announcement of the reopening of the Korean market

to U.S. beef and were concerned that the necessary safety

measures were not included in the agreement.  If their

concerns about beef were not addressed, Song said that the

UDP would be forced to oppose ratification of the KORUS FTA,

despite many members’ support for the agreement.  Turning to

North Korea, Song said that the DPRK might be willing to make

a deal with the U.S. while President Bush was in office to

move forward on phase three of the denuclearization agreement

if the terms were “very good,” but they were more likely to

wait for a new U.S. administration.  On South Korea’s

relations with the North, Song said that he perceived a

discrepancy between President Lee’s approach to the North and

the harder-line views of the Blue House staff — a difference

that Kim Jong-il would try to exploit to the fullest.  END

SUMMARY. 
——————————————–

BEEF SOLUTION SHOULD INCLUDE PHASED APPROACH

——————————————– 
¶2. (C) In a luncheon meeting with the Ambassador on May 22,

National Assembly member-elect (and former Foreign Minister)

Song Min-soon said that he was tactfully working to prevent

the current beef issue from becoming an anti-U.S. issue.

According to Song, Koreans felt that the beef agreement

appeared to be a hastily concluded deal designed to pave the

way for a positive summit between the two Presidents.  Song

quoted Gordon Hewitt, a British judge, who said “justice

should not only be done, but also clearly be seen as being

done,” to illustrate how Koreans felt ignored in the run-up

to the final beef agreement.  Most Koreans were caught off

guard because they expected a phased approach that would

first open the Korean market to U.S. beef less than 30 months

of age, with beef over 30 months of age being approved at a

later date.  This, Song said, would allow time for broader

safety concerns to subside.  The Ambassador explained that

there was no scientific basis for a two-stage approach; while

such an approach might have worked last year, we needed a

full market opening to ensure FTA ratification this year in

the U.S. Congress. 
¶3. (C) Song said that he had tried to lay the groundwork for

a successful beef agreement during his tenure as Foreign

Minister.  When he talked with members of Lee Myung-bak’s

transition team and suggested that they hold a special

meeting with ROKG officials to discuss the handling of the

beef issue, Song said his suggestions fell on deaf ears.

Instead, the new administration just “punched their way into

office” and were unwilling to heed outside advice, Song

lamented.  Song recounted President Roh’s phone conversation

with President Bush March 29, 2007, when the two discussed

the way forward on beef on the eve of the conclusion of the

KORUS FTA negotiations on April 2.  According to Song,

President Roh told President Bush that after the OIE made its

ruling, U.S. beef would not be treated unfairly in the Korean

market.  He pointed out that the uproar over the April 18

agreement was due in part to the agreement going further than

Roh had pledged without sufficient explanation.  Song said

that President Roh had planned to resolve the issue by the

end of 2007 in a manner that would not appear as though the

U.S. had “strong-armed” Korea into the deal, but he was

unable to do so. (COMMENT: This seriously downgrades what Roh

actually promised in March 2007, which was to “respect” the

OIG’s scientific guidelines. END COMMENT) 
————————-

BEEF LINKAGE TO KORUS FTA

————————- 
¶4. (C) Song said that although the beef deal may have helped

the KORUS FTA’s prospects in the U.S., it was having the

opposite effect in Korea.  Song said that beef and the FTA

should not be linked and that they had been dealt with

separately up until now.  The Ambassador said that the U.S.

had agreed not to include beef market opening in the FTA, but

to treat it as a matter of food safety, on the understanding

that it would be resolved on the basis of science and fact.

If the U.S. were to now change the agreement based on other

factors, U.S. industry representatives were likely to reject

the deal, and businesses across the board would lose trust in

the reliability of doing business with Korea. 
¶5. (C) Without changing the beef deal to include a phased

approach that would allow the UDP to get behind the deal and

save face, Song said that the UDP was not likely to support

the FTA.  “A vote for the FTA has been turned into a vote for

the beef agreement,” which UDP members could not support,

even those who had long favored the FTA.  Song inquired if

Korea’s ratification of the FTA was a requisite for U.S.

passage.  The Ambassador responded that it was not a

necessary condition but it would force the U.S. Congress to

take a more serious look at the agreement and preempt calls

to renegotiate the automobile chapter. 
—————————————

PROSPECTS OF NORTH KOREA DENUCLEARIZING

————————————— 
¶6. (C) Song said that the DPRK wanted to get de-listed from

the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism and was therefore

willing to move forward and provide a complete declaration of

its nuclear materials and programs.  Momentum created by this

declaration would likely slow as talks began on

denuclearization issues in phase three, as the level of DPRK

commitment becomes “much steeper” at that point.  Despite

this challenge, Song said that the DPRK might accept a deal

with the current U.S. administration to move forward with

phase three of the February 2007 agreement if the terms of

the deal were “very good.”  This said, Song thought that Kim

Jong-il was nervous to step into uncharted waters of giving

up his plutonium or allowing a U.S. Embassy to be opened in

Pyongyang, and he was likely to continue negotiating while

waiting to see who would become the next U.S. president. 
—————————

ROK POLICY TOWARD THE NORTH

————————— 
¶7. (C) Song characterized President Lee’s lack of willingness

to listen to members of the previous administration by

saying, “there is no one more blind than those who do not

want to see.”  Song said that he advised members of President

Lee’s transition team “not to step too far out on a limb with

regard to North Korea policy.”  Despite his advice, Song

judged the Lee team had gone too far and was having a hard

time “getting back to the trunk of the tree.”  Song said that

in his discussions with the transition team he perceived a

discrepancy between President Lee’s approach to the North and

the harder-line views of the Blue House staff — a difference

that Kim Jong-il would try to exploit to the fullest.  For

now, Korea should focus on denuclearization and let the dust

settle on North-South relations.  Once the dust settled, the

way forward would be clearer, Song said. 
¶8. (C) According to Song, Koreans wanted to see quick

progress in relations with the North and each Korean

president also should have the goal of advancing dramatically

the relations between the Koreas or, “he should not be

president.”  President Lee’s Administration was already

“under attack” by the people to do more in support of North

Korea, especially in light of the U.S. announcement that it

would provide food aid to the North.  South Korea felt that

it should be the “master” of the North and when another

country gets ahead of the South, the Korean people get

concerned. 
——-

COMMENT

——- 
¶9.  (C) Song is a savvy politician despite his protestations

that he did not know Yeoido or how to navigate in the

political world.  He proved this as he rose through the ranks

in the Roh administration despite being a “U.S. hand.”  He

has already done much to earn his spurs in the UDP by 
engineering the political attack on the Ambassador, and thus

the U.S., over a May 21 phone call between UDP Chair Sohn

Hak-kyu and the Ambassador.  A longtime U.S. expert known for

his aggressive negotiating style, Song is likely to be a

formidable opponent of the ROKG and at times the U.S. as he

works his way up the political ladder.  Assembly sources tell

us he will likely be on the Defense Committee.

VERSHBOW